[Espanol]
By Herbert Docena *
Sixteen years ago, the Philippine
Senate made the historic vote to shut down what American analysts
once described as "probably the most important basing complex in
the world" — the US military bases in Subic and Clark, along with
other smaller support and communications facilities in the country.
Taken after long and emotional debates,
the Senate vote shook the Philippines' relations with its most
important ally. That one small and weak country could say no to what
by then had become the world's only remaining superpower
reverberated across the world.
Since then, every move by the US
military in the Philippines has provoked controversy. For the most
part, however, the question has tended to be framed in terms of
whether the US is seeking to re-establish the kind of bases it had in
the past. Such framing has consequently allowed the US and Philippine
governments to categorically deny any such plans.
But what has since emerged is not a
return to the past but a new and different kind of basing.
GLOBAL POSTURE
Since the end of the Cold War, but in a
process that has accelerated since the Bush administration came to
office, the United States has embarked on what American officials
tout as the most radical reconfiguration since World War II of its
"global defense posture."
This term no longer refers simply to
the over 850 physical bases and installations that the US now
maintains in around 46 countries around the world.[1] As US Defense
undersecretary for policy Douglas J Feith explained, "We are not
talking only about basing, we're talking about the ability of our
forces to operate when and where they are needed."[2]
Billed as the "Integrated Global
Presence and Basing Strategy," the plan seeks to comprehensively
transform the US overseas military presence – largely unchanged
since the 1950s – in light of perceived new threats and the US'
self-avowed "grand strategy" of perpetuating its status as the
world's only military superpower.
"The [US] military," declared
President George W Bush, "must be ready to strike at a moment's
notice in any dark corner of the world."[3] To do this, the 2001
Quadrennial Defense Review, an official document required by the US
Congress of the Pentagon to articulate US military strategy, states
that the US is seeking to move away from "obsolete Cold War
garrisons" to "mobile, expeditionary operations."[4]
REDUCED FOOTPRINT
The plan is simple: Instead of
concentrating its troops and equipment in only a few locations, the
United States will decrease the number of large well-equipped bases
and increase the number of smaller, simpler bases in more
locations.[5]
Marine Gen. James Jones, commander of
US forces in Europe, described the aim as developing a "family of
bases" that could go "from cold to warm to hot if you need them"
but without having the "small town USA"-feel, complete with
schools and families that have typically come with such bases.[6]
Recognition of the rising opposition to
the US military presence around the world is also driving these
changes. As early as in 1988, a US government commission created
during the Reagan administration concluded that, "We have found it
increasingly difficult, and politically costly to maintain bases."[7]
Apart from those in the Philippines, US
bases have been closed or terminated in recent years in Puerto Rico,
Panama, and recently Ecuador, as a result of public mobilizations.
Turkey refused to allow the US to use its bases for the invasion in
Iraq. Even in Japan and Korea, hostility to bases has been growing.
Hence, the US has been trying to
restructure its overseas presence in a way that aims to undermine
this growing opposition. As US Navy Rear Admiral Richard Hunt, the
Joint Staff's deputy director for strategy and policy said, "We
don't want to be stepping all over our host nations…We want to
exist in a very non-intrusive way."[8]
The aim, according to the Pentagon, is
to "reduce the forward footprint" of the military while
increasing its agility and flexible.[9]
MISSION PRESENCE
As part of this over-all
reconfiguration, the Pentagon now categorizes its overseas structures
into three: Main Operating Bases (MOBs), Forward Operating Sites
(FOSs), and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs). (See Box 1 below.)
{xtypo_info}Box 1: CATEGORIES OF US OVERSEAS
MILITARY STRUCTURES
– Main Operating Bases (MOB) are those
relatively larger installations and facilities located in the
territory of reliable allies, with vast infrastructure and family
support facilities that will serve as the hub of operations in
support of smaller, more austere bases; examples are the Ramstein Air
Base in Germany, the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, and Camp Humphreys
in Korea
– Forward Operating Sites (FOS) are
smaller, more spare bases that could be expanded and then scaled down
as needed; they will store pre-positioned equipment but will only
normally host a small number of troops on a rotational, as opposed to
permanent, basis; while smaller, they must still be able to quickly
support a range of operations with back-up from MOBs
– Cooperative Security Locations (CSL)
are facilities owned by host governments that would only be used by
the US in case of actual operations; though they could be visited and
inspected by the US, they would most likely be ran and maintained by
host-nation personnel or even private contractors; useful for
pre-positioning logistics support or as venues for joint operations
with host militaries, they may also be expanded to become FOSs if
necessary
Source: US Department of Defense,
"Strengthening US Global Defense Posture," September 2004{/xtypo_info}
FOSs and CSLs are also called "lily
pads" intended to allow the US to hop from MOBs to their
destinations rapidly when needed but without requiring a lot of
resources to keep them running when not needed.[10] Referring to this
kind of base, Gen. Jones said, "We could use it for six months,
turn off the lights, and go to another base if we need to."[11]
But, as mentioned earlier, the US
definition of "global posture" goes way beyond physical
structures. In an effort to maximize its forward presence while
minimizing opposition, the US has also been seeking to increase what
US Air Force-sponsored analysts call "mission presence" and
"limited access." "Mission presence" is what the US has in
countries where there are ongoing military missions which "lack the
breadth and capability to qualify as true forward presence but
nonetheless contribute to the overall US posture abroad." "Limited
access" is the kind the United States gets through exercises,
visits, and other operations.[12]
Hence, the US' global posture
encompasses, by definition, not just those who are "forward-based,"
or those units that are stationed in foreign countries on a long-term
basis such as troops in Korea and Japan, but also those who are
"forward-deployed," or those who are sent overseas to conduct
various kinds of deployments, exercises, or operations.
THE GREATEST POTENTIAL TO COMPETE
If, in the Cold War, the US' overseas
presence targeted the Soviet Union and other communist and
nationalist forces in the Third World, today, the US' current
"global posture" is aimed at any state or non-state forces
perceived to be threatening the interests of the United States.
"Terrorists" stand in the line of
fire. Regional powers hostile to the United States, such as Iran and
North Korea, have also been singled out. But, in light of the United
States' self-declared grand strategy of preventing the rise of
rivals who could threaten its preeminent status, one rising power is
now clearly in its sights – China.
For years, American officials have been
divided between those who believe that China could be a "strategic
partner" to be engaged and those who believe that it is a
"strategic competitor" to be confronted militarily before it
grows more powerful. Since the end of the Cold War, indications are
that the latter view has prevailed.
As early as 1997, the Pentagon's QDR
had already identified China, along with Russia, as possible "global
peer competitors."[13] In 1999, a pivotal Pentagon think-tank
conducted a seminar to lay down all the likely scenarios involving
China. Its conclusion: no matter what happens, China's rise will
not be "peaceful" for the US.
In 2000, a US Air Force-funded study
argued explicitly in favor of preventing China's rise. Also in the
same year, Robert Kagan and William Kristol, two influential
commentators whose ideas have evidently molded US policy, proposed
that Beijing – along with Baghdad – should be targeted for
"regime-change."[14] The Project for the New American Century
(PNAC), a grouping whose members and proposals have since staffed and
shaped the Bush administration and its policies, supported the same
aims and made similar recommendations.
During the US presidential elections,
George W. Bush distinguished himself from other candidates by
singling out China as a "strategic competitor." Since then,
various officials have successively warned that China's military
modernization constitutes a direct threat to the United States.[15]
The Pentagon's 2006 official report
to Congress on China stated, "China's military expansion is
already such as to alter regional military balances."[16]
If in 2001 the QDR was still vaguely
worded, by 2006, when the next QDR was released, the assessment
became more explicit: "Of the major and emerging powers, China has
the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United
States…"[17]
MOVING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
The problem for the US is its
relatively weak presence in Asia. As a Pentagon report on China,
whose conclusions have been widely echoed, warned: "Lack of forward
operating bases or cooperative allies greatly limits the range of US
military responses…"[18]
What the US does have in terms of
presence is now believed to be concentrated in the wrong place. Since
the 1950s, the bulk of the US forward-presence in Asia has been in
South Korea and Japan, directed towards the Soviet Union and North
Korea. To address this, the US has been seeking expand southwards –
to Southeast Asia.[19]
By early 2002, the US began negotiating
with various governments in Southeast Asia for use of bases in the
region.[20] In 2003, then US Pacific Command chief Admiral Thomas B.
Fargo, stated, "Power projection and contingency response in
Southeast Asia in the future will depend on this network of US access
in areas with little or no permanent American basing structure."[21]
Along with the plans for East Asia and
Southeast Asia, the US had also established bases to the west of
China, in Central Asia, with new installations in Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan.[22] While it had none before the invasion of Afghanistan,
by 2002 it had access to over a dozen bases in the region.[23]
With the US forward presence northeast
of China (in Japan and South Korea), the deepening cooperation with
Mongolia to China's north, and its deepening alliance with India,
to China's southwest, the United States is slowly encircling China
from all sides.
It is in light of these large, sweeping
changes in US strategy, its perception of threats, and its tactics,
that US military objectives regarding the Philippines can be best
understood.
IN THE DRAGON'S LAIR
Since the late 1990s, a chorus of
American defense analysts, military officials, civilian leaders, and
influential commentators have identified the Philippines as playing a
critical role in the US' global posture and a succession of studies
sponsored for different US military services have singled it out for
its strategic location.
The PNAC, for example, had proposed
that the US Navy should establish a home-port while the US Air Force
should station a wing in the Philippines.[24] Another study for the
US Air Force (USAF) noted the Philippines is located firmly within
what US strategists have called the "dragon's lair" or those
areas of the Western Pacific where China could potentially seek to
prevent the US from deploying.[25] Another US Air Force-funded study
to develop a "global access strategy" for the US Air Force
proposed renting an island from the Philippines for use as a military
base.[26]
A 2006 USAF-funded study evaluating
basing options for storing and pre-positioning US' war material
included the Philippines as among the most desirable sites. Exploring
different alternatives, a US Army-sponsored research identified the
Philippines as one of the suitable locations for a new unit of the
Army.
Although proposals made by military
analysts do not necessarily translate into action, it is clear that a
consensus has been building that "[A] ccess to Philippine
facilities is much more important than most judged 12 years ago."[27]
THE APPEARANCE OF BASES
One obstacle however remains: domestic
opposition to US military presence in the Philippines. As yet another
US Air Force-funded study acknowledges, "On the matter of US
access to military facilities in the Philippines, the general view of
Philippine security experts is that for domestic political reasons it
would be difficult to give the appearance that the United States is
reestablishing its bases in the Philippines."[28]
Hence, the aim has been to avoid giving
this appearance. As Admiral Dennis Blair, former commander of the US
Pacific Command, explained, "[W]e are adapting our plans and
cooperation of the past to the future. Those plans do not include any
request by the United States for bases in the Philippines of the kind
that we have had in the past." [italics added] [29]
"Our basic interest," explained
former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "is to have the
ability to go into a country and have a relationship and have
understandings about our ability to land or overfly and to do things
that are of mutual benefit to each of us. But we don't have any
particular plans for permanent bases if that's the kind of thing
you mean…"[30]
Thus, instead of "the kind of bases
we had in the past", the US is trying something new.
TRAINING FOR ACCESS
First, the US has stepped up deploying
troops, ships, and equipment to the country ostensibly for training
exercises, humanitarian and engineering projects, and other missions.
Though the Visiting Forces Agreement
was approved in 1998, it was only in 2001 that the number and the
size of troops involved in training exercises jumped significantly.
Last year alone, up to 37 exercises were scheduled; up from around 24
in the preceding years.[31] As many as 5,000 US troops are involved,
depending on the exercise. As a result of these continuing
deployments, former US Ambassador to the Philippines Francis
Ricciardone has described the US presence in the country as
"semi-continuous."[32]
Apart from training allied troops, the
holding of joint exercises allows the US to gain temporary – but
repeated and regular – access to the territories of countries in
which the exercises are held. As former US PACOM head Admiral Thomas
Fargo noted in March 2003, "The habitual relationships built
through exercises and training…is our biggest guarantor of access
in time of need."[33]
He said: "Access over time can
develop into habitual use of certain facilities by deployed US forces
with the eventual goal of being guaranteed use in a crisis, or
permission to preposition logistics stocks and other critical
material in strategic forward locations."[34]
As US troops come and go in rotation
for frequent and regular exercises, their presence – when taken
together – makes up a formidable forward-presence that brings them
closer to areas of possible action without need for huge
infrastructure to support them and without inciting a lot of public
attention and opposition.
As analyst Eric Peltz has told the US
House Armed Services Committee: "Other methods of positioning, such
as training rotations, can provide a temporary ‘forward position'
or sustain a long-term position without permanent forward unit
basing."[35]
And as US troops depart, they leave
behind the infrastructure that they had built and used ostensibly for
the exercises and which could still be of use to the US military in
the future for missions different from those for which they were
initially built.
In General Santos City, for example,
the US constructed a deepwater port and one of the most modern
domestic airports in the country, connected to each other by one of
the country's best roads. In Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, where
US troops routinely go for exercises, the airport has been renovated
and its runway strengthened to carry the weight of C-130 planes.[36]
In Basilan and Sulu, venues of Balikatan exercises, the US, through
USAID, has also built roads and ports that can berth huge ships.
This is consistent with a USAF-funded
study which recommended having more deployments to have more
infrastructure. By increasing deployments, notes the study, the US
can get into arrangements that "include measures to tailor local
infrastructure to USAF operations by extending runways, improving air
traffic control facilities, repairing parking aprons and the
like."[37]
Along with troops, an increasing number
of ships have also been entering the country with growing frequency
ostensibly for exercises and humanitarian missions. "[T]he Navy
counts those ships as providing overseas presence full time, even
when they are training or simply tied up at the pier," said the US
Congressional Budget Office.[38]
As has been discussed earlier, the US
sees these regular and frequent "temporary" deployments as part
of its global "posture." As the US National Defense Strategy
states, "Our posture also includes the many military activities in
which we engage around the world. This means not only our physical
presence in key regions, but also our training, exercises, and
operations."[39]
BASE SERVICES WITHOUT PERMANENT BASING
Second, the US has obliged the Philippines to provide it with a broad
range of locally-provided services that would enable it to launch and
sustain operations from the Philippines when necessary.
In September 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo granted the US free access to its ports and offered
it overflight rights.[40] In November 2002, the US and Philippine
governments signed the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA)
which has been described by researchers with the US Congressional
Research Service as "allowing the United States to use the
Philippines as a supply base for military operations throughout the
region."[41]
The MLSA obliges the Philippine
government to exert "best efforts" to provide the US logistics
supplies, support and services during exercises, training,
operations, and other US military deployments. The agreement defines
these to include food, water, petroleum, oils, clothing, ammunition,
spare parts and components, billeting, transportation, communication,
medical services, operation support, training services, repair and
maintenance, storage services, and port services. "Construction and
use of temporary structures" is also covered.[42]
In other words, the MLSA gives the US
access to the full range of services that the US military would
require to operate in and from the country. Through the MLSA, the US
has secured for itself the services that it would normally be able to
provide itself inside a large permanent base but without constructing
and retaining large permanent bases – and without incurring the
costs and the political problems that such bases pose.
COOPERATIVE SECURITY LOCATIONS
Third, the US has established in the
Philippines a new category of military installations it calls
"Cooperative Security Locations" (CSLs).
In August 2005, the Overseas Basing
Commission, the official commission tasked to review US basing,
categorically identified the Philippines as one of the countries
where CSLs are being developed by the United States in the
region.[43] As mentioned earlier, CSLs is a new category of bases
that refers to facilities owned by host-governments but are to be
made available for use by the US military as needed.
The Philippine government has not
disclosed the locations and other details about these CSLs. But the
description by Robert Kaplan, a prominent American journalist and
best-selling author who has visited such facilities around the world,
is quoted here in full because of the dearth of information about
them and because parts of it could be describing the Philippines –
"A cooperative security location can
be a tucked-away corner of a host country's civilian airport, or a
dirt runway somewhere with fuel and mechanical help nearby, or a
military airport in a friendly country with which we have no formal
basing agreement but, rather, an informal arrangement with private
contractors acting as go-betweens… The United States provides aid
to upgrade maintenance facilities, thereby helping the host country
to better project its own air and naval power in the region.
At the same time, we hold periodic
exercises with the host country's military, in which the base is a
focus. We also offer humanitarian help to the surrounding area. Such
civil-affairs projects garner positive publicity for our military in
the local media…The result is a positive diplomatic context for
getting the host country's approval for use of the base when and if
we need it."[44]
The terms of the MLSA and the
establishment of CSLs reflect the US' increasing emphasis on
just-in-time logistics support and pre- positioning of equipment to
ensure that US forces – dispersed as they are to be around the
world, often far away from main bases where they store equipment and
use all kinds of services – are always ready and on the go.
Therefore, it is not so much the size of the base that matters but
whether it can provide the US military with what it needs, when it's
needed.
As the Council on Foreign Relations
points out: "While host nation support often carries the
connotation of basing, its role of staging and access is perhaps more
critical. Support for port visits, ship repairs, overflight rights,
training areas, and opportunities, and areas to marshal, stage,
repair, and resupply are no less important for both daily US presence
in the region and for rapid and flexible crisis response."[45]
FORWARD OPERATING BASE
Fourth, the US has succeeded in
indefinitely stationing a US military unit in the country.
Since 2002, a unit now called the Joint
Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTFP) has been deployed
to the southern Philippines. While initially presented as being part
of on-again off-again temporary training exercises, it has since been
revealed that this unit has maintained its presence in the country
continuously for the last six years.
With the Philippine government not
giving a definite exit date, and with US officials stating that this
unit will stay on as long as they are allowed by the government, it
is presumed that it will continue to be based in the Philippines for
the long-haul.
The unit is headquartered in the
Philippine military's Camp Navarro in Zamboanga City [46] but its
"area of operations," according to a US military publication,
spans 8,000 square miles, covering the entire island of Mindanao and
its surrounding islands and seas.[47]
According to a comprehensive
compilation of various media reports, the number of troops belonging
to the unit has ranged between 100 and 450 but it is not clear what
the actual total is for a specific period.[48] It varies "depending
on the season and the mission," said US Lt. Col. Mark Zimmer,
JSOTF-P public affairs officer.[49]
When it was publicly revealed last
month that the US Department of Defense, via a US military
construction unit, had granted a contract to a company providing
"base operations support" for the JSOTF-P[50], the US embassy
admitted that US was setting up allegedly "temporary" structures
for "medical, logistical, administrative services" and facilities
for "for them to eat, sleep and work."[51] The Philippine's own
Visiting Forces Commission also confirmed that the US maintains
"living quarters" and stocks supplies inside Philippine military
camps.[52]
FOR THE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA
Referring to their bases in Mindanao as
"forward operating base-11" and "advanced operating
base-921,"[53] the JSOTF-P corresponds to what a US Air
Force-sponsored study described as the ongoing "redefinition of
what forward presence means."[54]
In terms of profile and mission, the
JSOTF-P is similar to the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of
Africa (CJTF-Horn of Africa) which was established in Djibouti in
eastern Africa in 2003, also composed mostly of Special Forces, and
which has been described as a sample of the US austere basing
template and the "model for future US military operations."[55]
Indeed, more deployments similar to
that of the JSOTF-P and CJTF-Horn of Africa are planned in other
locations around the world in the future. [56] In 2004, former PACOM
commander Thomas Fargo talked about expanding Special Operations
Forces in the Pacific.[57] Apparently referring to the JSOTF-P,
former defense secretary Rumsfeld had also announced that the
Pentagon would establish more "nodes for special operations
forces."
"In place of traditional overseas
bases with extensive infrastructure," Rumsfeld said, "we intend
to use smaller forward operating bases with prepositioned equipment
and rotational presence of personnel… We will maintain a smaller
forward-presence force in the Pacific while also stationing agile,
expeditionary forces capable of rapid responses at our power
projection bases."[58]
The JSOFT-P's characteristics fit
this description. Modest and austere, the JSOTF-P has none of the
extensive infrastructure and facilities of the former US bases in
Subic and Clark. But with the availability of local logistics and
other services assured, the free entry of ships and planes and the
pre-positioning of equipment allowed, and with the new roads, ports,
and other infrastructure the US has been building in the area, the US
Special Forces will be ready and able at a moment's notice to
launch and sustain its operations in the region.
As evidenced by the fact that most
Filipinos are not even aware of their presence and their actions,
"the JSOTF had succeeded," notes Kaplan, "as a political
mechanism for getting an American base-of-sorts up and running…"[59]
C.H. Briscoe, command historian of the US Army Special Operations
Command, under which the units of the JSOTF-P belong, concurs: "After
more than 10 years, PACOM has reestablished an acceptable presence in
the Philippines…"[60]
Strategically positioned between two
routes at the entrance of a major sea-lane, the Makassar Strait, at
the southwestern rim of the South China Sea and closer to Malaysia
and Indonesia than most of the rest of the Philippines, the JSOTF-P,
according to Briscoe, is "now better able to monitor the pulse of
the region."[61]
Having secured this presence, the US
has become closer to the country with "the greatest potential to
compete militarily" with it. By getting the US "semi-permanently"
based south of Luzon for the first time since World War II, Kaplan
notes that "the larger-than-necessary base complex" in Zamboanga
has delivered more than tactical benefits.[62] In the minds of the US
Army strategists, Kaplan notes: "Combating Islamic terrorism in
this region [Southeast Asia] carried a secondary benefit for the
United States: it positioned the US for the future containment of
nearby China."[63]
QUALITATIVELY TRANSFORMED
All of the steps discussed above have
paved the way for the gradual and incremental re-entry of the US
military to the Philippines. At no time, since 1991, has US military
presence been more entrenched. At the same time, this presence is no
longer the same; it has been qualitatively transformed.
No longer are US troops permanently
stationed and confined inside large bases in two locations in the
country. Drawn instead from rotational forces, the troops have been
deploying in various locations all over the country for exercises and
other missions. Instead of being massed in the thousands inside huge
fortifications flying the US flag, they are in the hundreds,
dispersed and housed inside camps that technically belong to the
Philippine military.
In the past, US troops could, despite
the occasional deployment, expect to stay for long periods of time,
stationed in the same base for years. Now, they are to be always
ready and on the move, prepared to take part in shorter but more
frequent deployments overseas.
Before, they stored their equipment,
weapons, and supplies in huge storerooms and warehouses inside their
base complex at all times, ready to lift and carry them wherever they
went; now, they are scattering and storing their equipment and
supplies in various locations, guarded and maintained by host-nation
governments or private companies, and ready to be picked up on the
way to the fighting.
All these changes in the Philippines
are driven by the overlapping goals of building up support for and
countering domestic opposition to US presence while improving the
agility and efficiency of the US military.
TRIAL BALLOONS
But this too could change: for while
large bases have their disadvantages, they also provide the
guaranteed access, capacities, and other advantages that smaller more
austere bases cannot. Also, while the kind of basing that the US is
developing now can be useful for certain scenarios, they may not be
appropriate and sufficient for others. In case of a long drawn-out
standoff, for instance, it would take more than 500 Special Forces
stationed in relatively simple bases to sustain US military
operations.
Hence, given the right moment and given
the need, if plans are not in fact afoot, the US may still want to
re-establish larger bases in the Philippines. Given US strategy and
the Philippines' location, the possibility cannot be ruled out.
Indeed, the frequent reports that the US is trying to re-establish
bases in the country have been characterized by an analyst with the
Brookings Institute as "trial balloons" to test the
atmosphere.[64]
For the moment, however, it cannot be
said that just because the US does not have large bases of the kind
it used to have, the US has not been securing its military objectives
in the country. Through the back- door and largely out of sight, the
US has gradually but incrementally reintegrated the Philippines
firmly within its "global posture."
All these may have effectively reversed
that historic decision, taken 16 years ago, to end nearly a century
of US military presence in the country.
*Herbert Docena ([email protected])
is a researcher with Focus on the Global South
This article was published in three
parts by the Philippine Daily Inquirer, 15-17 October:
Part 1:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?
article_id=94438
Part
2:http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?
Article_id=94687
Part
3:http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view_article.php?
article_id=94921
NOTES:
[1] US Department of Defense Report to
Congress, "Strengthening US Global Defense Posture," September
2004.
[2] US Undersecretary of Defense for
Policy Douglas J. Feith, Prepared Statement before the House Armed
Services Committee, June 23, 2004, US Department of Defense website:
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=133
[Accessed September 10, 2007].
[3] quoted in G. John Ikenberry,
"America's Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs
September/Octoberober 2002, Vol 81. No 5.
[4] US Department of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, Washington D.C., February 6, 2006,
pp. V-vi,http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf
[Accessed September 10, 2007].
[5] US Department of Defense Report to
Congress, "Strengthening US Global Defense Posture," September
2004.
[6] Center for Defense Information,
"Worldwide Reorientation of US Military Basing," September 19,
2003,
http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfmDocumentID=1717&from_page=../program/document.cfm
[Accessed September 10, 2007].
[7] Commission on Integrated Long-Term
Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: US Government
Printing Office, January 1988), p. 22, quoted in Christine Wing, "The
United States in the Pacific," in Joseph Gerson and Bruce Richards,
eds., The Sun Never Sets: Confronting the Network of Foreign US
Military Bases (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1991), p. 144.
[8] Jim Garamone, "Global Posture
Part and Parcel of Transformation," American Forces Press Service,
October 14, 2004
[9] US Department of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, Washington DC, p. 53.
[10] John D. Klaus, "US Military
Overseas Basing: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress,"
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, November 17,
2004.
[11] quoted in David Isenberg, "The
US Global Posture Review: Reshaping America's Global Military
Footprint," Basic Notes: Occasional Papers on International
Security Policy, British American Security Information Council,
November 19, 2004, p. 3.
[12] David Shlapak, John Stillion, Olga
Oliker, and Tanya Charlick- Paley, A Global Access Strategy for the
US Air Force, Sta. Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002, pp. 17-18.
[13] US Department of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review 1997, Washington DC.
[14] Robert Kagan and William Kristol,
"The Present Danger," The National Interest, Number 59 Spring
2000.
[15] George Tenet, Director of Central
Intelligence Agency, "The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving
Dangers in a Complex World," February 11, 2003,
www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2003/dci_speech_02112003.html
[Accessed September 10, 2007]; Conn Hallinan, "Cornering the
Dragon," Counterpunch, February 23, 2005,
http://www.counterpunch.org/hallinan02232005.html
[Accessed September 10, 2007]; Mark Mazzetti, "Chinese Arms
Threaten Asia, Rumsfeld Says," Los Angeles Times, June 4, 2005)
[16] Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2006:
Annual Report to Congress, Washington D.C.,
http://stinet.dtic.mil/dticrev/PDFs/ADA449718.pdf [Accessed September
9, 2007]
[17] US Department of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, Washington D.C., February 6, 2006,
p. 29, http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf
[Accessed September 10, 2007]
[18] Under Secretary of Defense
(Policy), 1999 Summer Study Final Report, "Asia 2025" Organized
by the Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, 25
July to 4 August 1999, Newport Rhode Island,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/967.pdf [Accessed June 12,
2007], p. 76.
[19] Zalmay Khalilzad, David T.
Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa,
David A. Shlapak, Abram N. Shulsky, Ashley J. Tellis, The United
States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture, Sta
Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2001; Under Secretary of Defense
(Policy), 1999 Summer Study Final Report, "Asia 2025" Organized
by the Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, 25
July to 4 August 1999, Newport Rhode Island,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/reading_room/967.pdf
[Accessed June 12, 2007]; Project for the New American Century,
Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for
a New Century, September 2000.
[20] Michael Richardson, "US Wants
More Use of South Asian Bases," International Herald Tribune,
February 8, 2002.
[21] Admiral Thomas Fargo, transcript
of hearing of US House of Representatives Committee on International
Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, June 26, 2003.
[22] Robert D. Kaplan, "How we would
fight China," The Atlantic Monthly, June 2005,
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200506/kaplan [Accessed June 14,
2005].
[23] Rosemary Foot, "US Foreign- and
Domestic-policy Realignments after September 11," Adelphi Papers,
Volume 44, Issue 363, February 2004.
[24] Project for the New American
Century, Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces, and
Resources for a New Century, September 2000, Washington DC, p. 35.
[25] Roger Cliff, Mark Burles, Michael
S. Chaise, Derek Eaton, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon's
Lair: Chinese Antiaccess Strategies and their Implications for the
United States, Sta Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Project Air Force,
2007, p. 112.
[26] David Shlapak, John Stillion, Olga
Oliker, and Tanya Charlick- Paley, A Global Access Strategy for the
US Air Force, Sta. Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002, p. xxii.
[27] Michael McDevitt, "US Strategy
in the Asia Pacific Region: Southeast Asia," in US Strategy in the
Asia-Pacific Region conference proceedings, May 5, 2003.
[28] Zalmay Khalilzad, David T.
Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa,
David A. Shlapak, Abram N. Shulsky, Ashley J. Tellis, The United
States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture, Sta
Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 182.
[29] Transcript, Press Conference with
Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command, Manila,
July 13, 2001.
[30] Transcript, Press Conference with
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, April 25, 2002
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t04262002_t0425er.html
[Accessed September 10, 2007].
[31] Carolyn O. Arguillas, "Q and A
with US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone: ‘Ops-Intel-fusion is not
spying,'" MindaNews, February 28, 2005; Jojo Due, "Biggest
RP-US military exercise starts next week," Philippine Business
Daily Mirror, February 17, 2006.
[32] Carolyn O. Arguillas, "Q and A
with US Ambassador Francis Ricciardone: ‘Ops-Intel-fusion is not
spying,'" MindaNews, February 28, 2005.
[33] Admiral Thomas Fargo, transcript
of hearing of US House of Representatives Committee on International
Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, June 26, 2003.
[34] Admiral Thomas Fargo, Transcript
of Hearing of US House of Representatives Committee on International
Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, June 26, 2003.
[35] Eric Peltz, "Toward an
Expeditionary Army: New Options for Combatant Commanders,"
Testimony Presented to the House Armed Services Committee on March
24, 2004, p. 3.
[36] Karl Wilson, "US force in Asia
to become smaller but deadlier," Daily Times, August 22, 2004.
[37] Zalmay Khalilzad, David T.
Orletsky, Jonathan D. Pollack, Kevin L. Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa,
David A. Shlapak, Abram N. Shulsky, Ashley J. Tellis, The United
States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy and Force Posture, Sta
Monica CA: Rand Corporation, 2001, p. 63.
[38] Congress of the United States
Congressional Budget Office, "Options for the Navy's Future
Fleet," May 2006
[39] US Department of Defense, National
Defense Strategy 2005, Washington D.C., pp. 18-19.
[40] Rufi Vigilar, "Philippines opens
its ports to U.S. Military," CNN, September 18, 2001.
[41] Thomas Lum and Larry A. Niksch,
"The Republic of the Philippines: Background and US Relations,"
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, January 10, 2006,
http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RL33233_20060110.pdf [Accessed August 25,
2007]; Sheldon W. Simon, "Theater Security Cooperation in the US
Pacific Command," National Bureau of Asian Research Analysis,
Volume 14, Number 2, August 2003.
[42] Mutual Logistics Support Agreement
Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and
the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the
Philippines, November 21, 2002.
[43] Overseas Basing Commission, Report
to the President and Congress, August 15, 2005, p. H11,
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/obc.pdf [Accessed August 25, 2007].
[44] Robert D. Kaplan, "How we would
fight China," The Atlantic Monthly, June 2005,
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200506/kaplan [Accessed June 14,
2005].
[45] Council on Foreign Relations, The
United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New
Administration, July 2001, pp. 47-48.
http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/SEAsiaTF.pdf
[Accessed September 10, 2007].
[46] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On
the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the
Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.147.
[47] T.D. Flack, "Special Operations
Force Aiding an Important Ally," Stars and Stripes, March 11, 2007;
Col. Gregory Wilson, "Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation:
OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach," Military Review,
November to December 2006.
[48] At start of the deployment in
January 2002, there were supposed to be 160 to 250 who were joining.
(Steve Vogel, "Americans Arrive in Philippines U.S. Special Forces
To Aid Filipino Army In Threatened Areas," Washington Post, January
16, 2002; Fe B. Zamora, "All US troops will leave on July 31, says
Wurster," Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 1, 2002; Pat Roque, "US
Special Forces in Philippines," Associated Press, February 18,
2002; Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Philippine confusion,"
Washington Times, February 8, 2002). In November 2002, the Army
Magazine reported that there were 260 members of the task force were
in the southern Philippines. (Army Magazine, "News Call,"
November 1, 2002). In February 2003, 350 Special Forces were
reportedly scheduled to be sent to Sulu but this was postponed. (Eric
Schmitt, "US combat force of 1700 is headed to the Philippines",
New York Times, February 21, 2003; Bradley Graham, "US Bolsters
Philippine Force," Washington Post, February 21, 2003) In
Octoberober 2003, 300 Special Forces were reported to be in Basilan
(US spy aircraft deployed in Philippines," Octoberober 13, 2003 The
News International (Pakistan). By February 2006, 250 more troops were
reported to be joining those who were already in Sulu but it was not
clear how many were still there at that time ("RP-US to conduct war
games amid ‘rape' controversy, Philipine Daily Inquirer, January
10, 2006; "No time frame of US troops' stay in Sulu, Mindanews,
January 17, 2006). Shortly after, US military spokesperson Capt
Burrel Parmer announced that 400 US troops will be Sulu for various
projects. (Ding Cervantes, "5,500 US military personnel coming for
Balikatan 2006," Philippine Star, February 17, 2006). In September
2006, 114 US troops were reported to have arrived in Zamboanga City
as part of the "normal rotation" of soldiers under JSOTF-P,
according to the US embassy. (Julie Alipala, "100 Gis held at Zambo
immigration," Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 28, 2006). In
February 2007, US today reported 450 and Reuters put the number at
100 (Paul Wiseman, "In Philippines, US Making Progress in War on
Terror," USA Today, Februay 13, 2007; "Philippines increases
security for US forces," Reuters, February 26, 2007).
[49] "Civilians want probe on US
military's alleged supervision in Sulu war," MindaNews, November
24, 2005.
[50] In August 2007, Focus on the
Global South publicized the granting by the US Deparment of Defense,
through the US Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), of a
six-month $14.4-million contract to a certain "Global Contingency
Services LLC" of Irving, Texas for "operations support" for the
Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P). According
to its own website, the NAVFAC is the unit within the US military
that is in charge of providing the US Navy with "operating,
support, and training bases." It "manages the planning, design,
and construction and provides public works support for US Naval shore
installations around the world." Among their business lines are
"bases development" and "contingency engineering." According
to the announcement by the Pentagon, the contract awarded to Global
Contingency Services LLC includes "all labor, supervision,
management, tools, materials, equipment, facilities, transportation,
incidental engineering, and other items necessary to provide
facilities support services." Global Contingency Services LLC is a
partnership between DynCorp International, Parsons Global Services,
and PWC Logistics. The $14.4 million contract is actually part of a
bigger $450-million five-year contract for Global Contingency
Services to "provide a full range of world-wide contingency and
disaster-response services, including humanitarian assistance and
interim or transitional base-operating support services." According
to DynCorp's website, this will include "facility operations and
maintenance; air operations; port operations; health care; supply and
warehousing; galley; housing support; emergency services; security,
fire, and rescue; vehicle equipment; and incidental construction."
Contingency Response Services LLC describes its work as encompassing
"operating forces support," "community support," and "base
support." According to the Defense Industry Daily publication, the
contract also includes "morale, welfare, and recreation support."
The specific contract for work for the JSOTF-P is expected to be
completed in January 2008 but other contracts may follow as part of
the $450 million-package. ("Contracts, June 6, 2007," US
Department of Defense,
www.defenselink.mil/contracts/contract.aspx?contractid=3532 ; Press
Release, "DynCorp International and JV Partners Win $450 million
NAVFAC Contract," DynCorp International, November 2, 2006,
www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=197; "Contingency Response
Services," DynCorp International,
www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=204; Defense Industry Daily, "$14.4M
to help US SOCOM in the Philippines," June 8, 2007,
www.defenseindustrydaily.com/?s=philippines; Ethan Butterfield,
"DynCorp lands $450M Navy Contingency Services Deal," Washington
Technology, November 3, 2006;
www.washingtontechnology.com/online/1_1/29650-1.htm [Accessed August
20, 2007]
[51] "US denies building bases in
Mindanao," GMANews.TV, August 27, 2007.
[52] Veronica Uy, "VFACom Chief
Denies US bases in Mindanao," Inquirer.net, August 24, 2007.
[53] Maj. Kevin T. Henderson, US Army,
"Army Special Operations Forces and Marine Expeditionary Unit
(Special Operations Capable) Integration: Something a Joint Task
Force Commander should Consider," monograph, United States Army
Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military
Studies, May 19, 2004; Cherilyn Walley, "Impact of the
semi-permissive environment on force protection in Philippine
engagements," Special Warfare, September 2004; T.D. Flack, "When
Visiting Jolo, Show a Little Courtesy, Please," Stars and Stripes,
March 12, 2007.
[54] Andrew R. Hoehn, Adam Grissom,
David A. Ochmanek, David A. Shlapak, Alan J. Vick, A New Division of
Labor: Meeting America's Security Challenges Beyond Iraq, Sta.
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007, p.15.
[55] Stanley A. Weiss, "After Iraq, a
New US Military Model," International Herald Tribune, December 27,
2006.
[56] Greg Jaffe, "Rumsfeld details
big military shift in new document," Wall Street Journal, March
11, 2005.
[57] US Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld, Testimony to Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington DC,
September 23, 2004; Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, "Regarding the Defense
Global Forces Posture Review," Testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, September 23, 2004.
[58] US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, Annual Report to the President and the Congress 2005, p.
36.
[59] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On
the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the
Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.150.
[60] C.H. Briscoe, "Reflections and
Observations on ARSOF Operations During Balikatan 02-1," Special
Warfare, September 2004.
[61] C.H. Briscoe, "Reflections and
Observations on ARSOF Operations During Balikatan 02-1," Special
Warfare, September 2004.
[62] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On
the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the
Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.178.
[63] Robert Kaplan, Imperial Grunts: On
the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the
Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, New York: Vintage Books 2006, p.134.
[64] Catharin Dalpino, "Separatism
and Terrorism in the Philippines: Distinctions and Options for US
Policy," Testimony to Subcommitee on East Asia and the Pacific,
House International Relations Committee, June 10, 2003.
