The Philippine Experience:

CLIMATE CHANGE, DISASTER CAPITALISM, AND FOOD INSECURITY

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

The Philippine Experience:
Climate Change, Disaster Capitalism, and Food Insecurity

by

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In partnership with the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace

Focus on the Global South (Focus) is a non-governmental organization with offices in Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines, and India. Focus combines policy research, advocacy, activism and grassroots capacity building in order to generate critical analysis and debates among social movements, civil society organizations, elected officials, government functionaries, and the general public on national and international policies related to corporate-led globalization, neo-liberalism, and militarization.

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About the Cover
An old lady fetching water passing by two big ferries swept by typhoon Haiyan in Anibong, Tacloban

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Preventing Disaster Capitalism and Advancing Climate Justice, Human Rights, and People's Participation in Post-*Yolanda* Recovery Efforts*

By Mary Ann Manahan
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Introduction

Super typhoon *Yolanda/Haiyan* has been a wake up call to Filipinos and the bigger global community to the reality that the impacts of extreme weather events related to climate change are already being felt now, and thus the urgency for concerted response.

This paper calls attention to three critical issues that began to emerge after super typhoon Yolanda (aka Haiyan) struck central Philippines, bringing unprecedented havoc and damage to the lives of the people, especially in Region 8 or Eastern Visayas area. Foremost among these is the issue of land, land tenure, and resettlement.

To understand the magnitude of the impact of Yolanda and which sections of the population have been rendered most vulnerable, we need to consider the prevailing social-economic condition in the affected provinces before the typhoon.

The triennial government survey, *Family Income and Expenditure Survey* (FIES), showed that while the national poverty incidence among families decreased from 1991 to 2006 in Region 8, which was the most affected by Yolanda, this trend was reversed in the period 2006 to 2012 (See table 1).

From 33.7 percent in 2006, poverty incidence worsened at 34.5 percent in 2009 and further increased to 37.4 percent in 2012. This translated to one family out of three being poor in that year. From a total of 271,319 poor families in 2006, the number increased to 337,221 poor families in 2012.[1] This poverty situation would further worsen in Post-Yolanda.

Table 1: Poverty Incidence and Magnitude of Poor Families, by Region 1991, 2006, 2009 and 2012

Region/ Province	Poverty Incidence among Families (%)				Magnitude of Poor Families			
	Estimates (%)				Estimate			
	1991[a/]	2006	2009	2012	1991[a/]	2006	2009	2012
PHILIPPINES	29.7	21.0	20.5	19.7	3,554,878	3,809,283	4,036,915	4,214,921
Region IV-A: CALABARZON	19.1	7.8	8.8	8.3	234,129	189,690	241,158	256,839
Region IV-B: MIMAROPA	36.6	32.4	27.2	23.6	132,082	176,282	160,226	150,486
Region V: Bicol	48.0	35.4	35.3	32.3	395,592	361,802	385,523	375,974
Region VI: Western Visayas	32.3	22.7	23.6	22.8	345,102	316,669	353,431	365,040
Region VII: Central Visayas	38.2	30.7	26.0	25.7	345,870	411,431	378,221	405,694
Region VIII: Eastern Visayas	42.3	33.7	34.5	37.4	279,555	271,319	293,886	337,221
Region X: Northern Mindanao	42.6	32.1	33.3	32.8	236,172	263,982	298,472	320,113
Region XI: Southern Mindanao	34.1	25.4	25.5	25.0	187,065	229,801	252,152	268,957
Region XIII: Caraga	48.5	41.7	46.0	31.9	163,244	191,315	227,453	169,522

Source: Family Income and Expenditure Survey, "2012 Full Year Official Poverty Statistics: Table 1. Annual Per Capita Poverty Threshold, Poverty Incidence and Magnitude of Poor Families, by Region and Province: 1991, 2006, 2009 and 2012," Republic of the Philippines, Philippine Statistics Authority-National Statistical Coordination Board, December 9, 2013.

According to a recent study by Dr. Joseph Anthony Lim of the Ateneo de Manila University, entitled *An Evaluation of the Economic Performance of the Administration of Benigno S. Aquino III,* "based on latest evidence from the Annual Poverty Indicator Survey, there was in fact a 1.2 percent increase in poverty incidence at the regional level from the first semester of 2013 (24.6 percent) to first semester of 2014 (25.8 percent)" due to the impacts of super typhoon Yolanda and volatility of food prices, especially of garlic and onion.[2]

Government data also profiled the provinces as being mainly agricultural, with more than 30 percent of the land area in Region 8 devoted to rice, banana, coconut, and abaca. Leyte province was the country's second highest producer of coconut pre-Yolanda. Agriculture was also the top second employer of the people in the region, while the region was also primary source of freshwater fish and other marine resources. It is important to note that close to 20,000 farmers was already declared agrarian reform beneficiaries and poised to receive their Certificate of Land Ownerships (CLOAs) when the super typhoon devastated the region.

Despite the region's contribution to both the regional and national economy however, poverty was high in the agriculture sector. In 2012, the government reported that Region 8's poverty incidence among basic sectors such as farmers (49.2 percent), fishers (46.4 percent), women (44.9 percent), and children (56.5 percent) were all above national average rate.

Statistics indicate that rural poverty is directly linked to lack of entitlements and access to land as well as to other resources. In its study of the state of agrarian reform in 2013, Focus on the Global South found that provinces with high incidences and rates of poverty were those where big private landholdings had not undergone agrarian reform and where big landowners' resistance had been strongest. These provinces are in central Philippines and in the so-called Yolanda corridor such as Leyte, Iloilo, and Negros Occidental.[3]

Table 2: Top Provinces with Highest Land Redistribution Backlog, 2011 and Poverty Magnitude and Incidence, 2012

Provinces	Remaining Lands for Distribution (hectares)	Poverty (2012)†	
	2011 (a)	Magnitude (poor population)	Incidence (in percent)
Negros Occidental	144,861	916,694	32.3
Camarines Sur	63,042	771,984	41.2
Masbate	33,156	448,333	51.3
South Cotabato	40,703	430,210	32.0
Negros Oriental	24,027	638,466	50.1
Leyte	36,007	713,063	39.2
Iloilo	25,019	580,937	26.2
Isabela	57,730	365, 024	24.4
Lanao del Sur	39,567	687, 138	73.8
Maguindanao	29,034	571,223	63.7
Saranggani	18,450	269, 112	53.2

Source: Manahan, Mary Ann. "Narratives of Land: The Current State of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines" in Impact Magazine: Asian Magazine for Human Transformation Through Education, Social Advocacy and Evangelization Vol. 48 No. 4, April 2014, Social Foundation, Inc., Manila, Philippines"

† Based on National Statistical Coordinating Board data, February 2014 (a) Based on the PARC-DAR Data, March 2011. Table generated by Jerik Cruz and Mary Ann Manahan

Majority of those affected by Yolanda belonged to fishing, farming, and urban poor communities, indicating a crucial link between where they lived and where they worked or conducted their livelihood, thereby putting the issue of land tenure and resettlement at the heart of recovery and rehabilitation. Access to land and its resources and land tenure were issues already affecting the people before the super typhoon. Their situations, characterized by tenuous access to land and contentious land tenure and control over resources, have only worsened, as they continue to be displaced and to live under threat of total dispossession.

A 2006 study of the International Institute for Sustainable Development called *Addressing Land Ownership after Natural Disasters,* which was based on a survey of the Indian Ocean tsunami survivors, stated that the danger in "the displacement of large numbers of people without clearly defined land ownership can enable private and government 'land grabs'." The study also emphasized the crucial role of government in putting coherence in the efforts of non-government and donor/humanitarian organizations to ensure that the displaced communities would not be left out of the process of "re-registration, re-titling, and reconstructing records on land claims and ownership."

Equally important are the people's aspirations. Recovery and rehabilitation efforts would allow them to participate in deciding about their future. It is essential to know and understand their needs and what solutions they believe would best help them in their situations. The issue of land, land tenure, resettlement is not merely about livelihood or work and employment, but largely about recovering the survivors' lifelines, rebuilding their lives, and ensuring their survival in the future.

Recovery is about rights; what these people are entitled to according to these rights. This means that what the survivors experienced and continue to live through, what they think and envision, are all key ingredients in recovery and rehabilitation. Access to land and its resources, to safe shelters, and means of livelihoods, is closely linked to governance. As will be discussed in this paper, initiatives that have paved the way for the democratization of decision-making and which have given people spaces to directly contribute to their recovery have turned out to be more efficient and have higher chances of succeeding than the top-down approach mostly employed by the national government agencies.

More than a month after Yolanda, the government came out with several policy and institutional responses to address the challenges of relief, recovery, and rehabilitation. But what can be considered a major step was the creation, through the President's Memorandum Order 62, of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery or OPARR. Former Senator Panfilo Lacson Jr. was appointed 'rehabilitation czar'. The OPARR's main mandate was the "over-all strategic vision and integrated short- term, medium-term, and long-term plans and programs" in Yolanda-stricken areas. The office was also

mandated to: (1) coordinate with the National Disaster Risk and Rehabilitation Management Council (NDRRMC) and its member agencies; (2) consult with local government units (LGUs) in the formulation of plans and programs for the rehabilitation, recovery, and development of affected areas; (3) propose funding support for the implementation of the plans and programs, and; (4) exercise oversight over the relevant government agencies with respect to the implementation of the plans and programs. The OPARR was to be directly under the Office of the President.[4]

It was also OPARR's responsibility to coordinate projects across 10 sectors, which were divided into five Government Clusters: infrastructure led by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); livelihood headed by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI); resettlement led by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC); social services led by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD); and support cluster jointly headed by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and Department of Budget and Management (DBM). These clusters then would coordinate with the local governments in the latter's development and implementation of the Local Recovery and Rehabilitation Plans (LRRPs), civil society, private sector, development partners, and other interest groups. According to OPARR's August 2014 update report, LRRPs for Cebu, Iloilo, Eastern Samar, Leyte, and Tacloban City were already approved by President Aquino. As early as July 25, 2014, the Government Clusters had already vetted the LRRPs for the remaining provinces of Palawan, Masbate, Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Negros Occidental, Biliran, Southern Leyte, and Dinagat Islands, awaiting the president's approval. The OPARR estimated that around Php 170.92 billion were needed just for the priority projects of the five clusters.[5]

With the creation of this entirely new body that would have an overview and oversight function and was 'close' to the president, the aim was the speedy approval of recovery plans from the local government units and other agencies, and to facilitate the efficient implementation of recovery efforts by government. However, it was only in October 2014, a month before the first year commemoration of the tragedy that the Office of the President approved the OPARR-stamped plans. Still there would be more gaps and challenges in terms of how the government infrastructure for recovery functioned; especially in terms

of lack of clarity as to which agency would do what, as shall be seen in the case of identifying resettlement areas and constructing more permanent houses for the displaced.

Central to any discussion of recovery is the issue of vulnerability in the context of global climate change. The Philippines is one of the most vulnerable to climate change and highly prone to disasters and hazards. A report published by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in 2012 presented a "Philippine Exposure Map,"[6] which divided the country into specific zones and identified risks associated with climate change such as "extreme heating events, extreme rainfall events, sea level rise, increasing ocean temperature, and disturbed water budget in each of these areas." The map also showed that communities on the coastal areas faced the highest risk.

What science has been saying with greater clarity is that increased occurrences of extreme weather events like super typhoons Pablo (Bopha) in 2012 and Yolanda (Haiyan) in 2013 are related to global warming and climate change.[7] The stark reality that confronts highly vulnerable countries like the Philippines is that super typhoons like Yolanda are now considered part of the new normal and we have to come to grips with the fact that our very survival depends on our concerted and unprecedented efforts both at national and global levels to address climate change.

"Build Back Better"

On December 16, 2013, the National Economic Development Authority released RAY or *Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda,* which was to serve as the framework document to guide government's interventions; it also contained the initial assessment of Yolanda's impact and guiding principles to be implemented and coordinated by OPARR. Under the "Build Back Better" principle, RAY was to focus on the long-term, sustainable interventions to reduce the affected communities' vulnerabilities and strengthen their capacities to adapt and cope with future disasters. The responses were to be phased, cumulative, and flexible, and should recognize that the disaster affected men, women, and communities differently. RAY also emphasized the importance of community

participation in self-recovery and recognized that Yolanda would exacerbate poverty. The overall cost for recovery and rehabilitation was initially pegged at Php 360.8 billion (US$8.2 billion) for the period 2013-2017. This would be cut almost by half.

The key components of RAY were:

- Establishment of 40-meter no-build zones for housing and resettlement;
- Protection of pre-disaster property rights;
- Reliance on corporate private sector as major source of financing;
- Building of safer and better infrastructure;
- Jump-starting of agriculture: restoration of livelihoods, micro-credit schemes;
- LGU operations: provision of concessional loans beyond the Internal Revenue Allotment;
- Short-term employment: cash-for-work, food-for-work, public works, livelihood;
- Re-energizing of enterprises;
- Strengthening of Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM).

The "Build Back Better" framework was not a homegrown concept but an idea which emerged in post-disaster reconstruction situations following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. The Philippines' RAY was based on the notion of "seizing the opportunity to improve a community's physical, social, environmental, and economic conditions after a disaster to create a new resilient state of 'normalcy'."[8] There were a number of documents which operationalized or put this into practice, such as "Key Propositions for Building Back Better: A Report by the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery," "Principles for Settlement and Shelter" by UN Disaster Risk Office, "Post Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Strategy" by the Government of Sri Lanka, "Rebuilding for a More Sustainable Future: An Operational Framework" by Federal Emergency Management Agency, and "Holistic Recovery Framework."[9]

Similar to RAY, these documents identified three primary or priority areas essential to a successful rehabilitation and recovery intervention: risk reduction (principles of improvement of structural designs and land use planning), community recovery (social and economic recovery), and implementation (stakeholder participation, legislation and regulation, community consultation, and monitoring and evaluation).[10]

Night in Anibong

Apart from RAY, the OPARR released a 1,000-page document called the *Second RAY* and *Post-Disaster Needs Assessment,* based on inter-agency and ground verified information before President Aquino's Fifth State of the Nation Address in July 2014.

RAY talked about an 'outcome-driven implementation'. On *Housing and Resettlement,* the P-Noy government emphasized "self-recovery and community participation underpinned by a menu of approaches, housing, financing, and capacity building interventions that correspond to varied needs and choices of affected populations." However, in the case of the Tent City 'residents', no community participation was solicited in the building of the transitional houses in Brgy. Gogo, which stood on a one-hectare private land. The construction of close to 100 units of houses was overseen by the Department of Public Works and Highway (DPWH)- Region 6 led by Engr. Dennis Tupas.

During the field visit of Focus' program officer Mary Ann Manahan to the relocation site in January 2014, six long rows of six adjacent rooms on each side (12 in total for each unit) were slowly being finished. Workers from Negros were constructing two latrines. According to Engr. Tupas, the DPWH had initially

footed the bill, costing the department about PhP 30,000 pesos per room or a total of PhP 2.16 million for the six long rows. This would later on be transferred to the local government who would then choose the families that would stay in the units. What was quite obvious once one set foot on the relocation site was not only the hustle and bustle of construction work but the presence of 13 informal settlers sandwiched in the middle of the long row of houses. These informal settlers who were also affected by typhoon Yolanda wished to stay in these 'transitional' houses. Unfortunately, it was not up to them.

If they would not make it to the list of those who would stay, they would be evicted from the land. It remained to be seen at the time of the writing of this paper who would finally stay in the units; to take the challenge of no paved roads and costly transportation. There was also no access to public services such as electricity and safe drinking water. Life would be challenging for them.

The tentativeness of the situation has rendered affected communities more vulnerable and individuals almost helpless. The reconstruction process should not—must not—add to the helplessness of disaster-affected communities. The reconstruction of homes and community infrastructure are building blocks for sustainable rehabilitation. But this can only happen if unequal access to land and natural resources are addressed by the government, which means effectively implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, ensuring that indigenous peoples affected by the typhoon have communal and collective access and control over important resources, there is a harmonized land use policy, and women's access and control are also ensured. The post-disaster rehabilitation process offers a unique opportunity for the government to get its act together—not rely on corporations that will prioritize their bottom-lines when push comes to shove and have records of land grabbing and displacement of people. If it were serious about community participation and self-recovery, government should seriously think about protecting and promoting affected peoples' rights and not further deny them.

I. Land Tenure, Land Grabbing, and Disaster Capitalism

Why sound the alarm on ***disaster capitalism?***

In the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, which resulted in the deaths of more than 200,000 people and displacement of millions more in Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and India, coastal and farming communities had since faced land and tenure disputes, as private companies, with government backing, found an opportunity to push their own business projects during rehabilitation. Naomi Klein, author of *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism,* talked about how post-disaster projects had been used by governments, international financial institutions like the World Bank, and corporations to find "exciting marketing opportunities" in the wake of major crises, such as natural disasters. While people were still in shock or suffering from trauma, Klein said in her 2007 book, governments created unsafe "buffer zones" and disallowed the villagers to return because it was not safe, while on the other hand allowing developers to construct beach resorts and hotels.

Klein noted two main elements of disaster capitalism—"orchestrated raids on the public sphere in the wake of catastrophic events, and the treatments of disasters, as exciting market opportunities."[11]

The experience in post-Yolanda recovery and reconstruction clearly exhibited these two elements.

Re-organizing Public Sphere

This re-organization or what Klein also referred to as "radical social and economic engineering"[12] was most evident in at least two policies governing land use and land ownership in the Philippines.

Behind the rehabilitation and recovery plan were proposals aiming to re-organize space. A crucial component was the prompt determination and equitable redistribution of land ownership after natural disasters as this was key

not only in succeeding in short-term humanitarian relief but also in ensuring the resilience of communities and long-term impact of livelihoods.

True enough, re-establishing and reconstituting land rights have become most contentious in post-Yolanda communities, as well as in other post-disaster societies. For example, all coastal and environmental zones have been overridden and changed after disasters in Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Haiti. Coastal and agrarian communities have unfortunately been displaced in favor of tourism and other business interests.

No-Build Zone Policy

In the Philippines, the impact of this corporate-led rehabilitation is most evident in the situation of farmers, fishers, and urban poor communities who were displaced from their lands because of the devastation, and have been dispossessed the second time because they could not rebuild their homes and re-establish their lives and livelihoods in areas eyed for development into commercial and tourist zones. Even without clear and definite guidelines for implementation, except for putting up placards and streamers or fences identifying areas as part of the no-build zone, this policy has facilitated such business take-over.

President Aquino's announcement of a 40-meter-no-build-zone policy in December 2013, similar to Aceh's post-tsunami policy, created a lot of confusion and outrage among local governments, civil society groups, and communities and people affected by Yolanda. But it also sent a positive signal to land grabbers and claimants who have long been trying to evict fisher folk communities along prime coastlines and beaches so that they can develop the lands for more commercial purposes.

This policy pronouncement would be later revoked and revised by Secretary Lacson. The no-build zones became **no-dwelling** zones in consideration of the interests of tourism-related industry; but later, OPARR would backtrack to **safe zones, unsafe zones, and no-dwelling zones.** Sec. Lacson would also underscore the need to "consolidate land titles to establish land ownership,"[13]

which would entail land reclassification and property development projects, including infrastructure, housing, tourism, and clearing of coastal towns.

The shifting and unclear policy pronouncement has had a number of implications, primary of which have been the displacement of those who reside along the coast; confusion among LGUs; local communities; and even of humanitarian organizations. Also, more uncertainties on the issue of relocation (where, on whose lands, at what expense) or resettlement have emerged; and even among humanitarian organizations. It is feared that such policy would facilitate land grabbing and resource control by landed elites and other businesses (as this already happened in Sicogon Island in Iloilo).

While the reasons for relocating communities may appear sound when considering the risks from severe storms and natural disasters as well as overcrowding in poorly serviced areas, extensive resettlement in many different contexts shows that unless serious consideration is given to the social and cultural needs of the communities and to the regeneration of livelihoods in the new area, the negative impacts will likely be severe and fall heavily on the poor.

When the move is accompanied by a planned shift from coastline occupied by small fishing communities to that reserved for resorts, aquaculture, housing/real estate, other industrial interests, then relocation also represents government-sponsored land grabbing.

This is perhaps best illustrated by the case of 90 families that continued to live in the Tent City of Estancia, Iloilo, in hundreds of tarpaulin-made tents erected on the grounds of the Northern Iloilo Western University. Donated by UNICEF, Canadian, and Korean aid, the tents served as 'transitional houses' of families affected by the oil spill from a bunker owned by the National Power Corporation that capsized at the height of Yolanda's wrath.

There used to be thousands of people staying in the tents but those that have remained are the poorest and most vulnerable who did not have relatives they could stay with. Virginia Delos Santos and Mae An Francia, both mothers to small children, were among these families who needed more permanent shelter and location. "With the local government disallowing us to return to the oil spill

site, there is talk that we will be relocated temporarily in barangay Gogo, which is very far from our source of livelihood and children's schools. And we heard only for 6 months. It is ok for us not to return to our houses but our request is to have not only temporary relocation but a permanent one, and one that can hopefully withstand supertyphoons like Yolanda," they said during an interview with Focus.[14]

Access to information about their relocation and the local government's plans were also hard to come by. Virginia and Mae Ann and several other Tent City 'residents' who joined the interview said that after being visited by then local government secretary Mar Roxas and DSWD secretary Dinky Soliman who did not bother to talk to them, and by Vice President Jejomar , who promised monies for the affected families, no consultation has since been conducted to inform them about the relocation process.[15]

Evacuated victims/survivors of the disaster continue to experience land tenure insecurity since most of them could no longer go back to their previous areas of residence, which were also their areas of livelihood. Coconut and rice farmers as well as fisher folk continue to be uncertain whether they will still be allowed access to their previous communities and sources of income/livelihood. Contestations over lands have intensified and might result into further conflicts as a result of government-private sector reconstruction projects for real estate development that will not necessarily help or benefit the disenfranchised victims/survivors of Yolanda.

Land Grabbing and Assault on Agrarian Reform

In the 'island-paradise' of Sicogon local landlords, the Sarroza family, and private company Ayala Land developed the lands into a resort and the farmers who had legitimate claim under CARPER were no longer able to return to their areas. Fr. Edwin Gariguez, secretary general of the National Secretariat for Social Action (NASSA) of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, said (in an interview with Focus) that "the local company hired guards to harass the local residents and also demanded that the NASSA meet with them in Negros at a given time, or else they would demolish the houses of the local residents."[16] Ayala Land was one of the nine corporations tapped by government for rehabilitation of areas affected by Yolanda.

In just a year or so after Yolanda, media reported that about 3,000 families living in danger zones faced forced evictions.[17] According to Fr. Gariguez, this was also happening in Tacloban (Leyte province) though at a lesser extent. He also said that the local government was able to justify the transfer of people away from the center of the city using as excuse risks similar to what Yolanda created. Though they had identified relocation areas, those were far from displaced people's sources of livelihood. Meanwhile, the local government has plans to commercially develop the vacated areas.[18]

Access to and control of land resources is indeed at the front and center of the rehabilitation and recovery process. Specifically, the protracted and piecemeal implementation of the almost 30-year old agrarian reform program, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, which was later on amended

by Republic Act 9700 or CARP Extension with Reforms, has exacerbated pre-existing insecure situations in Yolanda-affected areas. DAR's data initially revealed that there were 128,369.21 hectares of lands that should have been acquired and distributed by government in the provinces affected by Yolanda. Half of these affected areas are in Region 8 and close to 20 percent in Masbate, one of the top provinces with large land distribution backlog.

Table 3: Land Distribution Balance in Yolanda-Affected Provinces (in hectares)

Province	Total Land Distribution Balance	Percentage/Share in Total Land Distribution Balance (in percent)
Region 8 (whole region)	64,311.36	50.10
Iloilo	16,579.18	12.92
Antique	1,238.97	0.97
Aklan	1,819.63	1.42
Cebu	2,074.11	1.62
Negros Oriental	14,086.81	10.97
Bohol	2,584.13	2.01
Masbate	24,919.37	19.41
Biliran	8.00	0.01
Dinagat	747.65	0.58
TOTAL	128,369.21	100.00

Source: Department of Agrarian Reform, August 18, 2014.

Civil society groups, as an effort to validate these figures on land balance, have uncovered more problems. Land rights advocate groups, RIGHTS-Network, and KATARUNGAN, which have been doing local organizing work in Leyte have found out that previously reported accomplishments of DAR Region 8, especially in Leyte, should be looked into and validated. Danilo Carranza, secretary general of RIGHTS-Network, told Focus that in the case of Yolanda-affected farmers, DAR Region 8 reported that the agency had distributed 11,685 land titles to about 8,000 farmers, but upon verification on the ground, Yolanda survivors who were the supposed beneficiaries had not received any CLOA.[19] These CLOAs were being withheld *motu propio* by DAR, which claims that it has the mandate to do such.

Local farmer leader Violeta Magadan of the Association of Farmers of District 6 in Barugo, Leyte, narrated at the House of Representative Committee on Agrarian Reform hearing in October 29, 2014 that "we were shocked to learn that Yolanda survivors in Alangalang, Barugo, Jaro, and Ormoc had already been in DAR Region 8's list of CLOA recipients since the 1990s." The DAR Central Office admitted that there had been delays in the releases of the land titles.

CLOAs serving as land titles and proof of ownership are required by the National Housing Authority (NHA) so that applicants can be included in the list of those who can avail of government support for housing and livelihood. Under such policy, landless farmers are being deprived of government support. In Ormoc, Leyte, for example, even CLOA holders who have not been installed in their lands have been denied livelihood support. Rosenda Apay, a leader of KATARUNGAN in Ormoc, asked "how can we rebuild our homes when the land where we use to live on and plant our crops are not ours?"[20]

Finally, it cannot be overstated that government needs to play a crucial role in putting coherence in the efforts not only of governmental bodies but also of donor/humanitarian organizations to ensure that the displaced communities are not left out of the process of re-registration, retitling, and reconstructing records on land claims and ownership. Here, the *Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries, and Forests in the Context of National Food Security* provides additional guidelines for ensuring the protection of tenurial rights of famers, fishers, and forest people in the context of climate change, disasters, and conflicts.

Part 6, Sec. 23.1 states that *"States should ensure that the legitimate tenure rights to land, fisheries and forests of all individuals, communities or peoples likely to be affected, with an emphasis on farmers, small-scale food producers, and vulnerable and marginalized people, are respected and protected by laws, policies, strategies and actions with the aim to prevent and respond to the effects of climate change consistent with their respective obligations, as applicable, in terms of relevant climate change framework agreements."*[21]

‘Exciting’ Market Opportunities

The second important element of disaster capitalism that was evident in post-Yolanda rehabilitation was the push for private sector participation and the creation of market opportunities in the aftermath of disaster.

While the implementation of government’s rehabilitation and recovery plan only started months after the super typhoon hit in November 2013, former OPARR head Senator Panfilo Lacson Jr. announced ahead that his thrust would be towards tapping big corporations and creating an enabling environment for private sector development of the devastated areas.

A cornerstone of OPARR strategy was encouragement of private sector participation in rehabilitation initiatives. Sec. Lacson stated that “when I first assumed office as PARR, I knew that current Philippine regulations and its concomitant bureaucracy would prevent the government from implementing rehabilitation projects as quickly as we wanted. Since part of OPARR’s mandate is to coordinate with the private sector, we tapped them to assist in the rehabilitation efforts.”[22] OPARR reports claimed that a total of 1,289 corporate private sector/NGO projects were since implemented on the ground. Also, that the pledges reached a total of Php 11.8 Billion.[23]

Indeed, giant corporations quickly signed up as ‘development sponsors’ tasked to ‘shepherd or take the lead in the reconstruction and rehabilitation.’[24] Perhaps as an act of ‘good faith,’ one mining company, Nickel Asia, even offered office space to OPARR at its headquarters in Bonifacio Global City, The Fort, Taguig. There was nothing wrong in giving OPARR that office unless there would be conflict of interest. But on June 23, 2014, Mr. Lacson recommended to DENR’s Sec. Paje the lifting of the mining moratorium against the Hinatuan Mining Corporation,[25] a subisdiary of Nickel Asia in Manicani, Samar. The reason for this, according to Sec. Lacson, was that such a move would be a “boost to government’s efforts to jumpstart the recovery in the lives of 500 families in Manicani, as well as the reconstruction efforts in Guian, Eastern Samar.”

Fr. Edu Gariguez, secretary general of NASSA called the incident as one of the "gray areas"; a case of "using corporate social responsibility, (while gaining) the trust of local residents in their area of operations."

The areas that have been identified for corporate sector involvement are: education (construction of schools and evacuation centers); health and nutrition (hospitals and command centers); and housing and livelihood. For the education sector, the following companies have signed up: the Tzu Chi foundation, a Taiwanese Buddhist Compassion Relief and International Humanitarian organization, Henry Sy's Shoemart (SM), giant telecom companies SMART a and PLDT and the Philippine Stock Exchange-listed LT Group, Inc. which owns Asia Brewery, Tanduay Distilleries and Eton Properties, Inc. For health and nutrition sector: the fast food chain company, Jollibee Foods and communication giants PLDT and SMART. For housing, it's SM, Energy Development Corporation, low-cost housing developer PHINMA, and Tzu Chi. Finally, for livelihood, PLDT and SMART.[26]

The development sponsors were to be allowed involvement in the 'updating' of community land use plans in their coverage areas. They would have *certain level of autonomy* to lead the rehabilitation plan in their respective geographic areas. A separate Yolanda Private Multi-Donor Fund managed completely by the private sector was also established for these efforts. The trustees of this Fund are giant multi-media and news and communications companies ABS-CBN and GMA-7; telecommunications companies PLDT-Smart and Globe Telecom; and businessman-philanthropist Washington Sycip.

In 2015, nine companies comprising the who's who in Philippine business pledged to 'adopt' two-thirds of the Yolanda-stricken local government units:

- Lopez Group of Companies;
- Ayala Corporation;
- Aboitiz Foundation;
- PLDT-Smart;
- SM Group of Companies;
- Metrobank;
- International Container Terminal Services Incorporated;
- Jollibee-Mang Inasal;
- Robinsons Land Corporation.[27]

The open-arms and business-friendly policy of Sec. Lacson, especially for the top ranking corporations in the Philippines with many investment and commercial interests in real estate development in many parts of the country, has enticed more companies and their foundations to sign up to be part of the rehabilitation effort. (See table 4) To a great extent, the OPARR strategy has led to the corporate capture of the rehabilitation and recovery agenda.

Table 4: Adopt-a-Town Development Sponsors

Province	Adopt-a-Town "Development Sponsor"
Aklan	Globe Telecom
Palawan	Secours Populaire Francais
Iloilo	Ayala Land, JG Holdings Summit, Inc.
Capiz	SMART Communications, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT)
Samar	Sagip Kapamilya
Easter Samar	Nickel Asia Corporation
Leyte	EEI Corporation, GT Metro Foundation, Lopez Group of Companies, PLDT, Aboitiz, Injap Land Corporation, International Container Terminal Services, Metrobank
Cebu	Aboitiz
Negros Occidental	Ayala Corporation

Source: Various news sources; Official Gazette, Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery http://www.gov.ph/section/briefing-room/presidential-assistant-for-rehabilitation-and-recovery/; Adaptation Working Group of the Philippine Movement for Climate Justice

II. Failure in Governance

Where are the people now in the bottom-up approach?

OPARR underscored the bottom-up approach in its strategy, but a lot was left to be desired as to what the bottom meant—or how far did it reach as far as the people were concerned. A review of the Local Recovery and Rehabilitation Plans led to an assessment that the language of these LRRPs did not reflect the

specificities of situation on the ground after Yolanda. These plans were totally neglectful of the people's aspirations as to what build back better and being resilient and empowered communities should mean from their perspectives. Several of these LRRPs in fact were crafted according to what were written in the RAY—one LRRP even called itself the local version of RAY; another one used in its submitted plan for recovery the economic development strategies crafted before Yolanda, as if no devastation happened, as if climate change did not have an impact on development. These LRRPs with their business-as-usual perspective ignored the needs and challenges hurdled daily by the people in affected communities.

The LRRP of the most-affected province for instance stated that the plan was anchored on the "governor's development agenda" for agricultural productivity and for creating a "friendly environment" for business, specifically for IT, tourism, and commercial development. This development framework was to be pushed amidst the lack of resettlement sites, the inability to provide more permanent homes for the displaced, and the lack of clarity on how they can have access to sources of livelihood because of the no-build zone policy. Another provincial recovery and rehabilitation plan meanwhile underscored the development vision of the provincial government for the province before Yolanda.

The Catholic church's National Secretariat for Social Action has its experience in the lack of opportunities for people to participate deeply and meaningfully in processes that would determine courses of action for recovery initiated by government. NASSA has dioceses in Palo, Leyte; Borongan and Calbayog in Samar, in Panay Island, northern Cebu, and Taytay in Palawan where it is implementing its recovery/rehabilitation projects for parishes and communities. The NASSA areas are composed of fisher folks in Panay, Palo, Guiuan, Samar, Basey, and Taytay; there are farmers in parts of Panay and Northern Cebu. There are also partner indigenous peoples in parts of Kalibo, Aklan province in Panay Island. Due to the scarcity of participatory, people-oriented processes, NASSA was motivated to design and implement its own Participatory Disaster Risk Assessment (PDRA). NASSA's shelter program was shaped by the beneficiaries themselves based on their needs, and was not subcontracted to a private company. NASSA also trained the beneficiaries in carpentry work so they could help construct their abodes.[28]

Both in the process of identifying resettlement lands and in building the houses, NASSA engaged and even worked with national and local governments. Said Fr. Edu Gariguez, based on this experience, *"Sa mga plano ng government, iyon ang, isa siguro sa mahalagang ma-address kasi nagkaroon din kami ng pagsusuri diyan eh, parang naging top to bottom din, kahit naman yung pagsasagawa ng grant lang ng OPARR, hindi talaga nagkaroon ng malawak na participation ang mga tao, kahit yung mga plano ng LGU hindi naman talaga ganoon ka consultative."* (In government's planning process, what should have been addressed was it is top-bottom approach; even in the grant giving process of OPARR, people had no sufficient participation; the LGU planning [process] was not consultative too.)[29]

In a research Focus conducted in 2014, which used focused group discussions among 65 women survivors of 2012 strong typhoon Sendong (Washi) in Cagayan de Oro (Mindanao), one of the main findings was how government's plan was disconnected from people's situation. The women respondents who had been relocated at the time of the discussions said "the distance from the urban center has made it difficult to earn from petty trade or other vocational skills. This has not been factored in (the) different trainings on income-generating trades."[30]

"Napurga mi sa training (We were over-trained) at the evacuation centers. I know how to curl hair, pedicure and manicure, cook *siomai* and *siopao,* and make rugs and peanut butter," said a woman from resettlement area Xavier Ecoville. She thought the trainings would increase her options for income generation, "but I could not ply any of these trades because for one, I do not have capital. And I do not want to latch on to the high interest rates of loans from the Bombay. Two, I cannot have paying customers here, as no one here can afford to pay for my services. I am supposed to offer my nail cleaning services among employees in government offices in the city. So in my spare time I just paint the nails of my children and neighbors and relatives but for free."[31]

The relocation site also affected their access to food as it was far from the markets where they used to buy their food; they have had to spend money for transportation equivalent to what could already be their budget for a meal. In Ecoville, where they now lived in 26-30 square meter houses, they were not

allowed to plant and raise livestock so that their food sources could be more stable. But they had been given seeds before they were transferred here.

The study *The Post-Disaster Phase of Transitional Settlement: A Perspective from Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) in Eastern Philippines* by the UCL Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction emphasized the importance of the transition period, the period of rebuilding from the time of emergency to permanent recovery. It is a "critical phase" as "it can determine the course of reconstruction and recovery, and contribute much to its eventual success or failure. During this period, survivors can either be lifted out of poverty and destitution, and protected against further hazard impacts, or left to languish in a state of perennial vulnerability."[32]

Children playing, unmindful of the dangers from the debris and ruins in Bacjao, Balanginga, Eastern Samar

UCL IRDR underscored the precariousness of the houses being built for the survivors/displaced due to the type of materials used and the lack of expert assistance in the kind of houses that should be built to protect the dwellers from future super typhoons.

The main questions the study raised were: "Did the transitional situation offer any clues regarding the outcomes in the longer term?"; "Does the ongoing process of recovery in the Philippines embody any sense of 'bounce-forward', or building back to higher standards of resilience?"; "What is the relation between transitional resettlement (in particular, transitional shelter), long term reconstruction and overall economic and human development?"[33]

With clear disparities between government's plans and the people's needs and aspirations for recovery and rehabilitation, the challenge lies in making LRRPs measure up to the situation of the people on the ground and to reflect their views of what is a better life/future.

III. Climate Justice in Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) and Development

Philippine Vulnerability

Central to any discussion on the Philippines and climate change is the issue of vulnerability. The Philippines is counted as one of the most vulnerable to climate change and highly prone to disasters and hazards. A report published by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in 2012 presented a Philippine Exposure Map (David, et al. 2012)[34], which divided the entire country into specific zones and identified risks associated to climate change such as "extreme heating events, extreme rainfall events, sea level rise, increasing ocean temperature, and disturbed water budget in each of these areas." The map showed that communities on coastal areas were the most vulnerable to such risks.

What science is now telling us with greater clarity is that increased occurrences of extreme weather events like super typhoons Pablo (Bopha) and Yolanda (Haiyan) are related to global warming and climate change.[35] The stark reality that confronts highly vulnerable countries like the Philippines is that super typhoons like Yolanda (Haiyan) are now considered part of the new normal and we have to come to grips with the fact that our very survival depends on our concerted and unprecedented efforts both at national and global levels to address climate change.

Government Response

The Philippine government's position reflects awareness of the link between disasters and climate change. Public pronouncements of government coming from concerned agencies like the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Climate Change Commission, and from President Benigno Aquino III himself all echoed the same underlying message that global action to address climate change would be the long term solution in addressing the devastating impacts of extreme weather events and climate-related disasters.

The government has already made considerable strides by putting in place national policies and institutions to deal with climate change, and by leading the calls for concerted global action. Certainly the heartfelt speeches of Climate Change Commissioner Nadarev Saño at the international climate conferences in Doha in 2012 and in Warsaw in 2013 have put the global spotlight on the impacts of climate disasters in the Philippines, and have helped to underscore the need for concerted action in the face of destructive impacts of climate change in the country. That same call to action was echoed by no less than President Aquino at the UN Climate Summit held in New York City in September 2014 where he outlined the efforts of the Philippines in "addressing climate change to the maximum with our limited resources."[36]

These actions outlined by the President included legislation that would lessen the impact of disasters by adopting a comprehensive approach to disaster response, empowering forecasting agencies, multi-hazard and geo-hazard mapping, a massive re-greening program on top of an intensified anti-illegal logging campaign, tagging public expenditure on climate change, and

engaging other stakeholders in developing a disaster risk financing and insurance policy framework that could reduce the impact of disasters on the poorest and most vulnerable Filipinos.[37]

The President also mentioned the passage of the Renewable Energy Act in 2008 and reported the Philippines' continuing efforts "to maintain and even improve our low-emission development strategy and the trajectory of our energy mix" as we continue to "tread a climate-smart development pathway." The President ended his speech by saying "Climate change does not recognize national boundaries, or political or economic affiliations" and calling on world leaders to "face these challenges and surmount them, or together we will suffer the consequences of inaction."[38]

For a low emitter yet highly vulnerable, climate disaster-prone country like the Philippines, the imperative in the climate negotiations is to demand binding and ambitious cuts in carbon emissions based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. This demand is primarily addressed to developed countries whose historical emissions have contributed most to climate change.

Another demand is for adequate finance to support measures to adapt to adverse effects and reduce the negative impacts of climate change.

Climate Finance[39]

Direct climate-related financial flows to the Philippines have taken the form of external grants and loans, government counterpart to external flows, and budgetary appropriations and disbursements. External grants have come from multilateral agencies like the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, United Nations and the European Community, bilateral or country donors, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and foreign NGOs and foreign and local private foundations.[40]

A national study commissioned by the government has estimated that the cost of implementing priority mitigation measures would amount to as much as US$29 billion for energy sector alone, and pointed out a serious inadequacy of financing for both climate change adaptation and mitigation measures.[41]

The report further pointed out that budgetary allocations by the Philippine government in the period 2004-2009 amounting to US$1.576 billion for direct and indirect climate change programs had exceeded the amount from external sources, which only reached US$0.509 billion in a direct and indirect grants and US$0.354 billion in direct and indrect loans.[42]

There are a number of critical issues on climate finance in the Philippines. Apart from the obvious concern over the inadequacy of external financial resources, there are a host of other issues pertaining to the composition of funds coming in—with most funds taking the form of loans than grants; the mis-prioritization of mitigation over adaptation measures; misuse of funds; and low capacity for oversight and regulation over these resources.

The climate finance situation has in fact been described by some NGOs as nothing short of chaotic and have called to task the government through the Climate Change Commission to institute mechanisms that shall ensure effective fund delivery, fiduciary, and transparency requirements that would build public trust and ensure participation by civil society organizations and congressional oversight.[43]

Loss, Damage, and Survival Funds

Two recent developments in the area of climate finance are worth examining in relation to how these measures can help support current and future DRR and climate change actions. The first is the passage of the national law creating the Peoples Survival Fund[44] and the second is the decision adopted in Warsaw, Poland under the UNFCCC for the creation of the Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damage associated with climate impacts. These two measures, one national and the other at the international level, provide new opportunities to make explicit the link and consequently the flow of resources needed to support the coordinated action to address the impacts of climate change and disasters and for strengthening the capacity of governments.

The PSF stated explicitly for example that: “further recognizing that climate change and disaster risk reduction and management are closely interrelated and effective disaster risk reduction and management will enhance adaptive

capacity to climate change, climate variability and extreme climate events, the State shall integrate disaster risk reduction into climate change programs and initiatives."[45]

The loss and damage mechanism can be viewed as recognition that adverse climate impacts are not something to be expected in the future but are already being felt by more vulnerable countries now and that resources must be made available to address the adverse impacts now.

Integration and Coherence of Policies

Despite the impressive policy and institutional responses as well as the strong messages from government to the global community, its own operational response to climate related disasters at home, in particular the work of the NDRRMC and certainly that of OPARR, operated on a whole different framework de-linked from the issue of climate change and the imperatives to addressing its long term impacts.

While the Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act stated that "disaster management, along with development planning in local communities," must be attuned to realities brought about by climate change there is a growing concern that a lot needs to be done to integrate climate change adaptation (CCA) in the overall disaster management strategy of the Philippines.

In a policy brief on disaster management in the Philippines, the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) for example noted that: "(I)n a multi-hazard environment, measures that enable communities to adapt to the phenomena of climate change must be incorporated in the PDRRM. Climate change intensifies impacts of typhoons, floods, and droughts; and thus, increases the vulnerabilities of communities to disasters."[46]

The NDCP paper further noted that "(A)t present, PDRRM and CCA have separate policy frameworks, but both aim to mitigate risks and manage effects of natural disasters resulting from climate change. The two sets of policies must then be integrated and mainstreamed in comprehensive efforts of government

and whole of society not only in disaster management but also in overall development planning."[47]

The same call for integration of policies was expressed by Defense Undersecretary Honorio Azcueta at the Fourth Session of the global platform on disaster risk reduction held in Geneva, Switzerland in May 2013. Azcueta reported on efforts of the Philippines to improve disaster risk reduction actions in priority areas identified under the Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) and to face the challenge of "integrating DRRM and Climate Change Adaptation into the Comprehensive Land Use Plan and other local laws, policies and plans; capacitating local communities down to the "barangay" (village) level; establishing DRRM offices and facilities; enhancing coordination and communication among stakeholders through a common platform; and whole-of-nation approach in all DRRM decisions and actions."[48]

Civil Society groups have also joined calls for CCA and DRR integration. A civil Society DRR-CCA Summit was held in March 2014 in Cebu, resulting in a statement at the end of the summit that declared that "disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA) work must be done with a long-term perspective, alongside and in partnership with communities, the private sector, and local governments, and CSOs."[49]

While the increasing convergence around this agenda of DRR-CCA both at the national and global levels is a positive step towards a more effective, long term, and strategic disaster management framework for the Philppines, there is also the danger that the emphasis on DRR-CCA will detract from the more fundamental objective of addressing the root causes of climate change and seeking justice in the wake of the climate crisis. DRR-CCA threatens to become the convenient 'landing zone' upon which the position of many countries both developed and developing on climate action would be anchored.

A concrete example is the "Post Haiyan Tacloban Declaration"[50] issued by senior national and local government officials, experts, international and regional organizations, international humanitarian assistance organizations, NGOs, private sector, civil society and media, participating in the ASEM Manila Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management last June 2014.

The document came out with a list of 30 unities affirming common positions on a whole range of issues from the role of government both at the national and local levels in DRRM and the importance of multi-stakholder approaches to DRR among others. What was sorely lacking in the document however was an analysis that would link disaster with the issue of climate change and its underlying causes. Neither is there a dicussion on accountability of industrialized countries and corporate culprits to the problem.

Climate Justice as a Framework

Apart from the need to harmonize efforts on DRRM and CCA, another contentious area is the framework guiding the Philippine government's response to climate change and disasters. For Focus on the Global South, climate justice is the framework that should underpin climate actions and disaster management in the Philippines.

It is important to reflect on three critical elements that define the climate justice perspective and how we can relate these to rehabilitation and recovery efforts.

1. Historical Responsibility and Climate Debt

The preamble of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) underscores this principle of historical responsibility when it noted that "(T)he largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs."[51]

Local communities also have their own definition of historical responsibility, looking at the history of environmental destructive projects and the proponents of these projects in their areas (i.e. logging operations, mining, etc.)

The main point that should be highlighted is that the process of rehabilitation and recovery should take into serious account not just the current state

Another storm is coming! (Lawaan, Eastern Samar)

of vulnerability of the communities but to trace the economic, social, and environmental changes that have happened in the communities that have contributed to heightened vulnerability. Furthermore, it is also important to identify the main factors and actors that created and continue to create negative impacts on the capacity of people and the environment to cope with disasters.

2. Push for genuine/real climate solutions and reject of false solutions

Another strong principle of the climate justice analysis and approach to the climate crisis is the push for genuine solutions and strong rejection of false ones. Climate justice advocates have put forward a strong position against 'climate profiteers'—those who are peddling so called climate solutions in the form of investments that do nothing to address the root causes of the problem. Projects under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) for example are aggressively pushed in the South as climate solutions that come in the form of investments by way of carbon offset schemes. As the report on CDM in the Philippines by Focus on the Global South (Docena 2010) pointed out however:

"Most of the "credits" being generated will go to projects that further exacerbate climate change and compromise sustainable development, enriching large conglomerates that are expanding extractive activities and those dependent on fossil fuel, in pursuit of objectives that could otherwise be achieved through more effective government regulation and community action. Rather than allowing governments and communities to embark on a just transition towards a more sustainable path, the CDM is rewarding government ineptitude and supporting the very agents that contribute to climate change, while allowing rich countries to continue avoiding the reductions necessary to mitigate climate change."[52]

The political and economic elites are key players in CDM projects in the country, such that the corporations, owned by the Zamoras and Aboitiz, receive carbon credits under CDM. These conglomerates likewise have been identified as major development sponsors in OPARR's recovery plan.

Using a climate justice lens, a serious conflict of interest arises when major polluters—the corporations engaged in extractive industries—have positioned themselves as key players in solving the climate crisis and in rehabilitation and recovery efforts, and aggressively pushing their own economic agenda in the process.

As the Climate Justice Now (CJN) alliance stressed in a statement "(S)olutions to the climate crisis will not come from industrialized countries and big business. Effective and enduring solutions will come from those who have protected the environment—Indigenous Peoples, women, peasant and family farmers, fisher folk, forest dependent communities, youth and marginalized and affected communities in the global South and North."[53]

3. Call for systemic change and transformation

A climate justice framework does not only address on rehabilitation and recovery but also development, putting at the center the needs of both people/communities and the planet above those of corporations.

Rehabilitation and recovery should aim not just to build back better but to ensure that the rebuilding process is one that recognizes and aims to correct long-drawn

injustices that increase our vulnerability to climate change, reduce our capacity to adapt and become resilient to adverse impacts, and weakens our political and moral force to demand global action to mitigate climate change.

A Climate Justice Test: Initial Ideas on How to Make the CJ Framework Operational

An initial step is to conduct local level climate justice discussions with local government units in order to push the agenda for the adoption of climate justice framework in local climate change and disaster management plans.

Developing and mainstreaming a 'climate justice test' could also be an effective assessment and planning tool as well as a strategy for mobilizing broad public support. The CJ test can be a checklist to determine how policies, development projects, and investments promote or exacerbate climate justice. This test could be used all over the country but especially in the most vulnerable areas in the country. Let us take for example the places hardest hit by the typhoons that devastated the country in the last five years. These areas can be declared 'climate justice zones' where plans for not only rebuilding and recovery but more importantly for a kind of development that will be pursued which recognizes the interrelated issues of climate change, disasters, and development can be implemented.

IV. Grassroots Responses

Apart from raising policy issues at the national level, various affected communities together with allied NGOs and networks have likewise engaged in actions on the ground to respond to climate disasters, build their resilience, enhance their capacities for implementing alternative ways of disaster response and rehabilitation, and to challenge the dominant model of development that exacerbates the climate crisis.

In Estancia, Iloilo province, the community pursued their own community-based disaster management program, taking on the task of building their capacities for

disaster management despite (or because) of the lack of support from the local government.

Communities came together in the aftermath of the disaster to organize and support efforts for orderly evacuations as well as to put up early warning systems at the community level.

Agrarian communities affected by typhoon Yolanda also took the opportunity, as part of their disaster response program, to raise awareness on land rights. In a province like Leyte for example, where thousands of CLOAs remained undistributed, increasing awareness of existing land laws was a primary concern. These awareness-raising initiatives were coupled with mass mobilizations and engagement with government agencies to demand accountability from government.

Organizations like Lilak or Purple Action for Indigenous Women's Rights and Alyansa Tigil Mina as well as national campaign network Philippine Movement for Climate Justice (PMCJ) responded to the crisis by accessing and providing direct relief assistance to their members and facilitating linkages to local and national government agencies in order for the survivors to demand their rightful share in the resources allocated by the national government.

V. Stories from the Ground

Redefining Resilience, Empowerment through Community Organizing

The survivors of the devastation have been called resilient. This word has been used in many different contexts and to imply various meanings. There are those who say that the survivors have been resilient to a fault because they just 'smiled' there way through their miseries instead of rising in revolt. Meanwhile, politicians have used the word as a way of excusing themselves from their obligation to meet the people's needs—that Filipinos are resilient so they can make do with the little that's thrown their way. The 2015 Peoples

Forum dubbed “Two years after: Yolanda survivors demand for justice” was an important venue for the people to define resilience; how people coped and survived; and their vision of a better, secure life. The stories have not only been about miseries; stories of home-grown models of build back better continue to be told. What is important is to view recovery and rehabilitation work within the context of human rights—that the lands and resources for housing and livelihood, and social-economic well-being and development of survivors have to be provided because these are entitlements accorded to the people by their right to decent housing and right to access resources crucial to food security and livelihood.

On the ground we saw efforts to build on the strength of the people which did not totally disappear with the storm surge. Two good initiatives focusing on community empowerment and governance were NASSA’s PDRA and CMDRR. Under the Participatory Disaster Risk Assessment (PDRA), the communities themselves made maps of high risk areas, which highlighted information on ecosystems, vulnerabilities, and even income levels of communities. Through this participatory process, the shelter and livelihood programs that were developed for the rehabilitation phase reflected not just a national development agenda, but reflected sensitivity to the people’s situations. NASSA also developed its Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (CMDRR) framework, with emphasis on the role of community members as managers.

The homeowners’ organizing initiative of the Urban Poor Associates (UPA) was another experience that should be harnessed and replicated. Homeowners Associations may seem odd in a situation where the resettlement plan and land tenure were still uncertain, and where based on the government recovery and rehab plans the priority was commercial development of lands. Why have associations when there were no proper homes and most survivors still live in makeshifts or bunk houses? But this organizing initiative has become an opportunity to educate the people about their housing rights, which are guaranteed under the Urban Development Housing Act. UPA and the informal settlers communities were able to negotiate with local government and seek their cooperation through these homeowners associations.

Stories of Resistance to Land Grabbing

In the aftermath of Yolanda, Amelia dela Cruz, woman farmer leader from Sicogon Island in Iloilo told Focus how the Sarroza family, owner of the Sicogon Development Corporation (SIDECO), took advantage of the tragedy to displace people from their lands and homes and deprive them of relief goods and support. “Our greatest problem after Yolanda was that we could not rebuild our houses; only five percent of previously existing houses survived. Our fishing livelihood vanished as well. SIDECO took advantage of this post-disaster tragedy. Yolanda had been their ally, they said. They gave us three options: first, they would give us Php 150,000 payment if we would leave; second, they would relocate us to another island with free housing, water, and electricity; third, if we wouldn’t agree with any of the options, they would demolish our communities,” said dela Cruz, a member of one of the remaining families who stood their ground on the 1,160 hectares of land in Sicogon, 72 hectares of which had been classified as alienable and disposable, and could be distributed under CARP.[54]

According to various sources and documents secured by this paper’s authors, SIDECO had entered into a joint venture partnership with Ayala Land to undertake supposedly a “Sicogon Island Redevelopment Project,” which could parallel the world-famous Boracay Island-resort. In a media report on April 9, 2014, Ayala Land director Antonino Aquino stated that “we’re looking around for properties in Sicogon. We’re interested in expanding our tourism portfolio.”[55]

Meanwhile, more than five months after being left homeless by Yolanda, residents of Sicogon Island were still fighting for a decent place to rebuild their lives and their homes.

On April 12, 2014, members of the Federation of Sicogon Island Farmers and Fisherfolk Association (FESIFFA) sounded again the alarm on the living conditions of over 6,000 residents of Brgys. Buaya, San Fernando and of Alipata in Sicogon Island. According to them, not only had no single government agency assisted the residents of Sicogon Islands in reconstructing their homes and recovering from the impacts of the typhoon, but there were also continuing harassments and other rights violations by SIDECO, which prevented them from returning to their lands.[56]

FESIFFA President Raul Ramos told Focus that "with no options left to rebuild our communities, we are being forced by the government and by SIDECO to occupy public forest lands as a resettlement site, even without support and approval from official authorities. Because government agencies have systematically failed to protect our rights in the face of SIDECO's post-Yolanda land-grabbing efforts, we have nowhere else left to go."[57]

Ka Raul was referring to the recent initiative of more than 200 Sicogon families to settle in a portion of a 282-hectare public forest land area in Brgy. Buaya, Sicogon as last ditch effort to rebuild their homes and lives. Since March 28, 2014, FESIFFA members had sought to establish a residential camp in the public forest lands, having been displaced by Yolanda in November 2013, followed by a mass eviction orchestrated by SIDECO. Both SIDECO and its allied officials in the local DENR threatened to file cases against FESIFFA farmers for their occupation of the public forest lands.

Earlier, claimed FESIFFA in a statement, SIDECO had prohibited the island's residents "from reconstructing or even simply repairing their houses. Instead, the corporation offered the residents two options: a) PHP 150,000 for each family who will voluntarily vacate the islands; and b) a relocation site in Barangay Jolog, Estancia Iloilo." Most of the families who had opted for either of these options, according to FESIFFA, attempted to return to the island, both due to the substandard quality of relocation homes offered and the lack of available resettlement areas in the Yolanda-stricken region.

In an effort to highlight their plight, some 100 residents from the island went to Manila and carried out an indefinite camp-out in front of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources last May 2014. The residents led by Ka Raul were able to conduct and exhaust various dialogues with government agencies and gathered significant public, media, and social movement support for their cause. The National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC), in particular, stepped in to assist in the dialogues as well as the housing needs of the residents. Other groups such as the Dutch development organization, ICCO Cooperation, helped through the provision of boats and livelihood of FESIFFA members.

Months after their camp-out, various threats against them still lingered in various forms: notice to vacate the island, prohibition to repair and rebuild their houses, legal cases against them by the DENR for forest occupation, and legal cases against their leaders. At some point, Ayala Land stepped in and offered various packages to them: Php 121 million for infrastructure and agricultural production and 75 square-meter for each of the 100 families for each of the barangays. The FESIFFA members did not relent until the day commemorating Yolanda's first year anniversary when they were "put on the spot" to sign on an alleged "win-win" solution between the warring parties. FESIFFA, the residents of Sicogon, SIDECO, and Ayala Land inked a compromise agreement, which would allow the development of Sicogon into an eco-tourism area, on one hand; and on the other, would allow the farmers-fisher folk and residents to continue living in the island, halt the harassments and intimidations of the developers' security

A look through my lens (Bacjao, Balanginga, Eastern Samar)

guards, and secure their rights to the land under CARP. This was witnessed by NAPC Secretary Joel Rocamora and other government officials. But the case was still unraveling and perceived as an unjust resolution for FESIFFA at the time of this paper's writing.

Mobilizing IP Women against Hunger

Climate change disrupts community life and further weakens the already fragile social-economic fabric that still sustains the community. Women play a critical role in sustaining family and community life and ensuring that kinship and cooperation do not disappear in the aftermath of disasters.

Bulig was a network of mostly women cause-oriented groups formed in the aftermath of Yolanda to respond to the needs of affected communities, especially of the women. Its members were the National Coalition of Rural Women (PKKK), Lilak, Sarilaya, Women's Legal Bureau, Focus on the Global South. Lilak, Sarilaya, and Focus worked among the communities in Antique province. Indeed, without the women leaders of the village-level self-help groups in Latazon, Tigunhao, and Guiamon in Antique, the relief and initial rehabilitation efforts of Bulig would not have been conducted as efficiently as it had proceeded.

In these villages in Lauan as well as those also in the uplands of Valderrama, another municipality in Antique, indigenous women were at the forefront. They drew up the list of beneficiaries, helped in assessing the situations of community members, organized the conduct of relief distribution, including the repacking of goods, and negotiated with other community members who had not been affected by the super typhoon so the latter would understand why they couldn't be beneficiaries, especially of housing materials.

The priority of the women was to ensure non-costly but nutritious food even through self-reliant measures to avoid dependence on donated goods. They helped organize a feeding project by contributing their communities' traditional crops, such as peanuts and root crops. The women themselves chopped, washed, and cooked the hearty, nutritious meals. Discussions on sustainable healthy diet led by Sarilaya complemented the feeding.[58]

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Women's Responses to Climate Change-Induced Food Insecurity Among Households in Post-*Sendong* Resettlement in Cagayan De Oro

By Lina Sagaral Reyes*

Background

Since 2011, at least one severe typhoon had struck the Philippines yearly, with each storm leaving in its wake devastating impact on people's lives and property. On December 17, 2011, typhoon *Sendong* (international code Washi), became the first strong typhoon to hit Northern Mindanao. In 2012, typhoon Pablo hit eastern Mindanao and in 2014, Yolanda devastated the Visayas.

The United Nation's Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change had repeatedly warned that as a result of global warming, extreme weather such as long intense droughts and severe storms will take place, creating widespread disasters among the most world's most vulnerable populations in economically poor and developing countries.

Indeed, in the aftermath of Sendong, after the flashfloods, about 70,314 families (228,576 persons) were affected. Of these, 38,071 families (228,576 persons), or around 54 percent were residents of Cagayan de Oro City.[1]

About 13, 321 families, or 65,046 persons, who survived the calamity in Cagayan de Oro city, were rendered homeless and took to living in evacuation centers and transition shelters for months and in some cases for more than a year. Most of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) were landless informal settlers who had built their residences of wood and other light materials along the flood-prone banks and deltas of the Cagayan de Oro River, areas earlier

A little girl running an errand passing by the ruins of the Convent in Guiuan, Eastern Samar

identified as risky no-build zones by government agencies. Most of these settlers were migrants drawn by convenient livelihood sources as cheap providers of services and petty trade in and near markets, ports, inland transport terminals, small-scale trading centers, hotels, and government offices and agencies.

Within six months after the disaster, four resettlement sites were completed out of the planned/proposed 20 sites, and by the first quarter of 2014, almost 7,000 homeless families who had been earlier housed in temporary tent cities were relocated in new homes in areas deemed safer but situated far away from the urban centers.[2]

In a comprehensive post-Sendong disaster needs assessment report released in June 2012, the gender, social protection, and livelihood sector identified a recovery framework which served to guide local governments and civil society organizations providing support for the IDPs in their journey to recovery.[3]

It was expected that after the disaster, implementation of the framework and its strategies, embraced by the IDPs as their own, would help ensure the recovery.[4]

Post-Sendong Budgeted Priority Areas for Social Protection, Gender and Livelihood for Cagayan de Oro (in million of pesos)



Adapted from PDNA report, June 2012.

Other priority areas identified but unfunded as of June 2012
Provision of food, non-food for vulnerable groups like women, children, and the elderly
Capacity building for the implementation of RA 9262
Provision of hygiene kits
Relocation of damaged daycare centers
Protection monitoring, quick impact livelihood, capability building in relocation areas
Community enterprise/other livelihood projects

Methodology

This quick study seeks to determine the quality of the post-disaster women's lives in the nexus of climate change and food security. It is important to gain insights on how they have been responding to food security challenges encountered while establishing homes and engaging in the (re)building of communities after experiencing disaster, displacement, and homelessness. From their experiences, lessons can be gleaned on how government and non-government organizations can strengthen support for them as well as for those who share the same plight after two extreme weather phenomena in two subsequent years. The study uses qualitative and quantitative data gathered through a survey and two-sessions of focus-group discussions among 65 randomly selected women in six of the 12 completed post-disaster resettlement sites in Cagayan de Oro. The FGDs were held in May and July 2014 in the resettlement sites.

The women were residents of the following villages: St. Augustine Tabang Oro Village in Barangay Lumbia; Xavier Ecoville in Barangay Lumbia; Fil-Chinese Village in Barangay Canitoan; Gawad Kalinga/SM-BDO Village in Barangay Calaanan; Indahag Phase 1 in Barangay Indahag; and Indahag Phase 2 in Barangay Indahag.

All but nine of the respondents were married at the time of the study. Among the married, six were widowed after Sendong and one, years before the storm. Of the nine unmarried females, six were single parents leading households, two lived with partners and one with her elderly parents. Their ages ranged from 24 to 69 years old. Thirty-six percent or 24 of the females were family heads. Five women who claimed that their husbands headed their households as sole income-earners were really de facto heads, as their husbands were most often absentees, staying at work sites or working overseas as contract workers.

The questionnaires sought to surface the women's knowledge and awareness of climate change and its impacts on personal lives and community. The intended results would also include the degrees of awareness on disaster prevention, risk reduction and management skills, and their perceived roles in combating the causes of climate change.

During the focus-group discussions, the women were asked to determine the status of food security of their families/households and their responses to challenges and difficulties posed by climate-change induced food (in)security.

Women's Perceptions of Climate Change

Except for the women in two Lumbia-based villages, most of the interviewees were not aware of climate change's impact on their lives. The women, who claimed they were able to study some college courses, said that they got information while in school and from their children who learned about climate change in the classroom. Some of them said they had heard of the discussions in television and radio shows, and read about it too in posters at a supermarket.

All have taken orientation seminars on disaster preparedness and risk management, and even participated in drills at the village level. Some were even members of the village's disaster preparedness and management teams.

Most understood the connection of deforestation and logging to floods, but could not yet discern the link between deforestation and the phenomenon of global warming and severe or extreme weather conditions.

When prompted that the effects of climate change manifest not only as severe and stronger typhoons like Sendong, but also as longer and more intense droughts and famine, they said that they did not see the need to brace themselves against drought. They added that they did not see the need to press the emergency button as they did not have farms and trees, and because they thought that they should only prepare for storms and floods.

When the impact of drought was explained, one of them said that because it was a slow(er) event than a storm, they would have the lead time to think of how to deal with its impacts. They thought of drought as something to be feared less compared to a storm. "We have enough time to think about the heatwave, higher food prices and food shortages while a typhoon happens so quickly, we barely have time to think what to do next to protect ourselves and family." Still, they thought that they would be unable to provide their families with food stocks

to last even a day or a week in the event of a storm like Sendong. They said that they would rely on government agencies and the church/religious groups or non-government organizations to take care of their food needs in the event of storm or flooding. The important thing would be to seek shelter in a safe evacuation center in case another Sendong strikes, they also said.

Some of those who claimed awareness of climate change talked of how they can responsibly contribute to efforts to stave off its effects: by refusing to work in mining and logging industries; by not burning trash especially plastics; and by using eco-bags instead of non-biodegradable plastic bags. But none of them was aware of the concept of climate (change) justice nor did they perceive their powerlessness in the bigger and complex dimensions of global energy consumption, global warming, and the impact of climate change on the poor and vulnerable populations of the world.

Insights on Food Availability

According to the United Nations, food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.[5]

Much has been written to point out how in rural areas climate change impacts rural women's food production, and thus, their food security. The risk of hunger arises from fluctuations in production since most of what they eat are harvested from the land and little is bought elsewhere. But in the case of grassroots women in peri-urban settings who are mostly food net buyers, the risk to food security is due to fluctuations in income.

- In the case of the women in resettlement areas in Cagayan de Oro, only two of the informants were engaged in food production, part-time and seasonally cultivating a relative's small farm in a nearby town. As most of them were poor landless migrants, they did not produce their own food but were largely food consumers.
- This was rather ironic because most resettlement sites were situated in peri-urban settings at the city's outskirts, surrounded by productive agricultural

areas where rice or corn, fruit trees like mangoes, bananas, and lanzones, and cash crops like cashew and abaca, were being grown.

- There were restrictions on using areas in the resettlement site for livestock production and informants recalled having signed agreements not to raise livestock or chickens within residential quarters. The restrictions were due to sanitation and health considerations. The allocated house size ranged from 26 to 30 square meters, and there was hardly any front and back yards so that it would be impossible to raise livestock along the 'row of houses'.
  An informant said she had defied the restrictions and raised two pigs inside her house but it was hard work to keep clean the pens and dispose of the pig's offal daily. She was able to raise enough money by selling the pigs after three months and used most of the money to pay for the tuition of a child in college.
  She said: "I secretly raised pigs. I knew it was against the rules. I was ready to face the consequences, but I thought it was a better way to earn for my daughter's tuition. Why, would they want me instead to steal money somewhere? Can they really evict me had they found out?"
- Another woman shared her experience in raising pigs and goats but she had built pens in a vacant lot, just outside the resettlement perimeter.
- The women were hoping that the government would eventually allow them to utilize under-used areas like abandoned houses in the resettlement site as spaces for livestock so that they could supplement their food consumption and increase their income.
- When they left the evacuation centers to resettle in these new homes, each household were provided seed packets by non-government organizations but most of the seeds, according to the women, could not be used for lack of space for planting. Those who were able to grow vegetables from these seeds were able to harvest *petchay,* cucumber, tomatoes, *kangkong,* bitter melon, and eggplants, though they noticed that the plants were stunted due to insufficient water supply in the area. The produce from these front-yard gardens supplemented their food needs for a time.
- In four of the resettlement sites, however, collectively-managed gardens of lemongrass, moringa, and yams were grown. The women growing gardens in their own yards used recycled tetra-packs which were sewn together as these were previously plentiful at the evacuation centers. Some of the extra vegetables were sold at church yards sales and markets.

Food Access

Most of the households continued to procure their food staples from the public markets where they had always bought food before Sendong struck. But there was a stark difference; they used to live in villages at the city center not very far from markets, which could be reached by walking, but now the villages were located at least 10 to 20 kilometers away from the nearest public market. The cheapest cost of public transportation was already enough to pay for a meal to feed a family of five.

Alternative sources of food in the neighborhood were *sari-sari* store, *talipapa* (sidestreet mini-markets), church-based groups and non-government organizations (NGOs), and neighbors and relatives, among others.

The distance from the urban center made it difficult to earn from petty trade or technical skills. This was not factored in when they had been given different trainings in income-generating trades.

- "Napurga mi sa training (We were over-trained) at the evacuation centers. I know how to curl hair, pedicure and manicure, cook *siomai* and *siopao,* and make rugs and peanut butter," said a woman from Xavier Ecoville. She thought that the trainings would increase her options for income generation. "But I could not ply any of these trades because for one, I do not have capital. And I could not afford the high interest rates of loans from the 'Bombay'. Second, I cannot have paying customers here; no-one here can afford to pay for my services. I am supposed to offer my nail cleaning services among employees in government offices in the city. So in my spare time I just paint the nails of my children and neighbors and relatives for free.''
- They thought that fresh capital for their home-based endeavors and vending will help them tide over and reduce hunger risk for their families. At the time of the study, capital in the form of loans/credit was only available through *pautang* (lending) firms that sent out their staff in motorcycles, and they charged very high interest rates. They were wondering if NGOs or government could offer start-up grants to be given gratis and without obligations for payments; they hoped it would be available to women and

not only to men. They said they had heard of such grants assistance for Sendong victims and survivors but they had not received such amount, which they said was announced in the local papers.

- They shunned Grameen banking, as previous experiences with collective loan systems did not work out well for them so they would rather take responsibility for personal loans.
- Most of them considered themselves unemployed but they kept their households afloat by engaging in various home-based and small-scale or petty trades or by providing labor services as laundrywomen, part-time nannies, and cleaning women to middle-class residences in nearby subdivisions. Some of them also sold snacks and cooked food for the neighborhood.

Sources of Food Among Households in Resettlement Sites



In two villages, most of the women (11 out of 15) said that they no longer held the purse and didn't have much say about the food they served daily. Their husbands came home on weekends, not with money but with rice and various canned goods that would serve as the next week's food ration. However, the wives said they did not feel that they have lost much as they ceded responsibility in making decisions about what food to buy, how much, when, and where to buy, and even passed on the marketing task itself to their husbands. In fact, they felt relieved of the responsibility of making both ends meet with very little cash on hand. "So my task is focused on preparing the food every day," said one. This bought them more hours to attend to the needs of their children or their elderly parents, or to engage in home crafts like rug-making or sewing of tote bags.

This pattern of decision-making had departed from what survey showed among almost the same communities in 1996-97 on food procurement, access, and consumption, which were still the main tasks of wives. (6)

% of Expenditures Among Households in Resettlement Sites



Three discussion groups had one thing in common: they no longer planned in terms of budgeting by the week or day, but meal by meal or one meal at a time. *"Ang among paniudto dakpon namo human sa pamahaw, ang panihapon human sa paniudto. Usahay wa nay pamahaw o panihapon. Kas-a ra mokaon."* (We run after our lunch and breakfast; at lunch we go after our supper. Sometimes we forego breakfast or supper. We eat only once.)

The women all agreed that between 70 and 80 percent of incomes generated by households were spent on food. Education, communication, and transportation ranked next to food while utilities such as light and water, clothing and health and entertainment were at the bottom of the expenditures spectrum.

Food Consumption

A trend that could be cause for worry was that canned food and instant noodles, the convenient survival fare during most of their stay at the evacuation centers, continued to hog the limelight on their dining tables. When asked to give a sample menu of three meals they had prepared for their families in the past week, most women mentioned canned goods such as beef loaf, corned beef, pork and beans, sausages, and sardines as part of each meal, and mostly these were served fried.

Fresh vegetables and fruits were seldom mentioned. When these were mentioned, these were usually *malunggay, alogbati,* eggplants, mung beans, and squash; as well as Cavendish bananas (scraps from an exporting banana plantation) and the occasional fruit in season such as *lanzones*, *rambutan*, and *marang*. The women said that they too were bored by the frequent fare of processed food but these were affordable and convenient. Besides these were easier to keep as they did not have electricity yet and so cannot keep meat; neither fish nor vegetables stayed fresh without refrigeration.

The informants all agreed that they preferred rice to corn or root crops as staple. Expenditure for rice took about 60 percent of overall food budget. The rest went to viands, mostly canned goods and instant noodles.

Sample breakfast and lunch menu for three days



The women believed that only rice could appease their hunger and give them more energy, despite hearing information that corn and root crops, like sweet potato or *camote*, were healthier and cheaper choices. “You can have rice with just salt or soy sauce. But not with corn; besides the price difference between the two cereals were too narrow to matter,” they pointed out. “I cannot afford anymore to buy meat or fish or even vegetables, and now I am deprived of (eating) rice too?” asked another, indicating her refusal to forego her main staple and comfort food.

The lack of food diversity and nutritional value of most components of their diet was cause for concern, especially because they themselves used to eat better before Sendong despite their having been informal settlers living in no-build zones; they remembered they were eating more and better because food was more accessible and choices available.

It would have helped if the study also dealt with nutrition status indices like mother and children’s weights; illnesses; water and sanitation, but the latest data were not available from concerned government agencies at the time of the fieldwork.

Challenges and Difficulties

At the FGDs, the women were asked to mention at least three difficulties and challenges they had encountered as they tried to meet the daily food needs of their families.

These are the challenges/difficulties mentioned
Not enough cash to buy food
Unemployment/no source of income
Debts to pay
High prices of food commodities
Sickness in the family/maintenance medicines
Lack of capital to restart business
Costs of transportation
Rejected credit request at neighborhood sari-sari store
Lack of water
No power or electricity for refrigeration
Poor health; inability to prepare/cook meals

On the other hand, the women also mentioned how they dealt with these difficulties and challenges:

Borrowed money or food items from neighbors, friends, or relatives
Missed a meal (ate only once or twice)
Bought cheapest, poorer quality or recycled food items like cooking oil
Sold clothes, house goods
Pawned appliance/jewelry
Sold livestock, poultry
Sought assistance from church, NGOs

Recommendation

Women in post-disaster resettlement sites in Cagayan de Oro City had to rely on inner strength, resilience, and collective resources to deal with the challenges and difficulties resulting from food poverty. There is now a huge opportunity to boost their enthusiasm, resourcefulness, and optimism so that they can find and own sustainable ways to deal with climate-induced food insecurity in their midst. Infusing awareness and in-depth understanding about the dynamics of climate change and climate justice will provide them with the kind of perspectives that will ensure that they can assert their rights to basic services such as water and electricity, access to credit, and freedom from hunger.

Notes

(6) Morales, Beethoven C. "Power Relations in Filipino Households:The Case of Southern Philippines," pp. 29-39, in Social Science Information, special Issue of the research Institute for Mindanao Culture (RIMCU), Xavier University, vol 27 No2, July-December 1999.

Endnotes

1 Storm Sendong Post-Disaster Needs Assessment Report, June 2012. International Recovery Platform.http://www.recoveryplatform.org/assets/publication/Final_PDNAReport_13June2012.pdf

2 Storm Sendong Post-Disaster Needs Assessment Report, June 2012. International Recovery Platform.http://www.recoveryplatform.org/assets/publication/Final_PDNAReport_13June2012.pdf

3 Storm Sendong Post-Disaster Needs Assessment Report, June 2012. International Recovery Platform.http://www.recoveryplatform.org/assets/publication/Final_PDNAReport_13June2012.pdf

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5 "Gender, Climate Change and Food Security," Global Gender and Climate Alliance and the United Nations Development Programme. .http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/gender/Gender%20and%20Environment/PB4_Africa_Gender-ClimateChange-Food-Security.pdf

*Focus on the Global South tapped Ms. Reyes, a researcher, writer/journalist based in Cagayan de Oro, to help conduct the research for and writing of this paper.


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