By Mary Ann Manahan, Focus on the Global South-Philippines/Southeast Asia Program

We are seeing the retreat of agrarian reform as a result of the Department of Agrarian Reform's (DAR) lackluster performance, national government's budget cuts for program implementation, 'reforms' that block land redistribution and an ineffective bureaucracy that has not been responsive to the urgency of completing CARPER targets.

Agrarian reform under the P-Noy government has been marginalized, even de-prioritized as the program's exit in 2014 nears. No amount of "we are on track" pronouncement by Malacañang can refute organized farmers' assessment that CARPER is failing under P-Noy's helm. The non-implementation of CARPER, unfortunately, will affect 1.1 million farmers in the country.

Since February 2012, farmers from all over the country, from different people's organizations and federations, are camped out in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform in an effort to show their discontent over the paralysis of agrarian reform implementation in the country. Their placards and streamers are not only expressive demands but also reflections of the real state of agrarian reform.

Doom Spell for Millions of Small and Landless Farmers

With barely 27 months to go, one would expect that the P-Noy government should have been in a hurry now to distribute lands as provided for in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program extension with reforms (CARPER) law. After all, the deadline for the land acquisition and distribution component of the program is June 2014. Presidential spokesperson Edwin Lacierda has claimed that CARPER implementation is on the right track. "The issue of agrarian reform is a cause for concern for us and we are on track. We are implementing CARPER... and even ahead of the 2012 acquisition target," he said.

But the Department of Agrarian Reform's (DAR) 2011 accomplishment report belies such claims. Based on official report, DAR was only able to distribute 86,209 hectares in 2011, which is only 43 percent of its targeted 200,000 hectares of land. This is a measly eight percent of the total balance of 1.06 million hectares up for land distribution. These figures are based on the initial report released by the department in January. Expectedly, DAR was heavily criticized by groups of organized farmers, rural women, farmworkers and NGOs. A month after DAR released a new accomplishment report, which contains a recalibrated balance and target. The changing and confusing targets for land distribution are major obstacles in the immediate, effective, efficient and equitable implementation of CARPER.

In 2010, DAR distributed 88,545 hectares. At this rate, DAR will need to distribute at least 34,064 hectares of land per month starting March 2012 if it wants to finish the land distribution before the June 2014 deadline of the LAD component. Majority of the remaining lands are private agricultural lands, comprising the "heart of the program."

It is however noteworthy that in 2011, 60 percent of the total land distributed was in Mindanao. North and South Cotabato accounted for majority of these lands. (See table 1 and table 3) On the other hand, Luzon accounted for 21 percent of the lands distributed; 35 percent of which were located in the Bicol region. Four of the top 20 provinces with the highest land acquisition and distribution backlog are in Bicol. In the Visayas, which accounts for the highest number of land up for distribution, only 19 percent of the total 2011 accomplishment was redistributed. In Region 6 or Western Visayas, a dismal 2,710 hectares of land out of the 28,263 hectares- target was distributed. Negros Occidental accounted for 1,151 which is only six percent of the province's target for 2011 (see table 3). The province has the highest LAD backlog, with 135,199 hectares of land that should be redistributed but are not.

Negros and the Bicol region, which cover 28 percent of the balance, are agrarian hotspots, where landlord resistance is most severe and is marked with intense agrarian-related violence and conflicts. If the P-Noy government is serious with real redistributive reforms, LAD in these two regions will serve as its litmus test. 

Table 1. Land Distributed vs. Target in Mindanao in Hectares, December 2011

Regions/Philippines	Accomplishment	Target
Philippines	86, 209	200,000
Region 9	2,006	6,879
Region 10	2,532	13, 981
Region 11	3,860	6, 224
Region 12	32,185	33,612
CARAGA	4,024	7,331
ARMM	7,053	6,500
TOTAL	51,660	54,332

Source: Department of Agrarian Reform, Summary of LAD Accomplishment by Province (in Hectares), January 1, 2011 to January 11, 2012

Nominal distribution 

If the numbers above are already disheartening, the figures pertaining to actual installations of farmer-beneficiaries, title-in-hand, in the redistributed lands is gloomier. For instance, the figure in Mindanao (which has a 95 percent accomplishment rate in land redistribution) further begs the question: how many hectares were subjected to alternative venture agreements (AVAs) such as leaseback arrangements? Mindanao is well known to be the land of AVAs with farmers owning the land but having no control over the production, i.e. "ownership without control."

Mindanao also has the most number of commercial farms, comprising some of the most contentious landholdings. A 10-year deferment period had been previously approved in Congress, favoring the powerful lobby of agribusiness and landlords, which consequently delayed redistribution of these landholdings from 1988 to 1998.

Data from July 1999 of the DAR Planning Division showed that at least 1,935 commercial farms covering an area of 67,556 hectares were supposed to be distributed after the commercial farm deferment that expired in 1998. In Davao, there were 22 plantations for deferment that haven't been redistributed, nine of which have been placed under lease contracts and will probably remain under new lease agreements even after the land is distributed under CARP.

 

Table 2. Estimated CARP Lands Subject to Proposed and Approved AVAs, in hectares, 2007

	Location	No. of Hectares
AVA Task Force List	Nationwide	9,869.601
Dolefil and DARBCI	South Cotabato	8,860.000
FPP and NGPIMPC/NGEIMPC	Agusan del Sur	6,827.000
Total		25,556.601

The available data make it difficult to establish the number of CARP awarded lands covered by leaseback and the other AVAs (see table 2), but one can surmise that such agreements (leaseback, contract growing, joint ventures, etc) have been prevalent in most of the deferred commercial farms that were distributed after 1998. Romulo dela Rosa (2005) asserts that agribusiness companies like Dole and Del Monte actually "invented the leaseback scheme to circumvent CARP." There have also been reports from farm workers that such schemes have been in effect in the land that they work on. The inadequacy of government support services often forces farm workers to enter into such arrangements (since they lack the necessary capital to continue making the land productive). In most cases, the AVAs are a precondition to the redistribution of the land, i.e. the landowner will only allow coverage under CARP if the potential beneficiaries enter into first into an AVA with them.

 Table 3. Top 20 Provinces with Highest Land Redistribution Backlog viz.

Target-Accomplishment in Hectares, as of December 2011

Provinces/Country	Balance	2011 Target	2011 Accomplishment	Percentage (Target vs. Accomplishment)
Philippines	1,060,432	200,000	86,209	43.10
Negros Occidental	135,199	18,778	1,151	6.13
Camarines Sur	58,401	15,476	3,508	22.67
Masbate	52,122	6,633	1,161	17.50
North Cotabato	51,118	13,000	13,014	100.11
Leyte	46,543	9,139	4,764	52.13
Maguindanao	45,081	1,500	3,896	259.73
Isabela	44,290	4,405	1,032	23.43
South Cotabato	39,901	13,105	13,172	100.51
Lanao del Sur	36,278	2,500	3,107	124.28
Lanao del norte	26,301	3,674	3,23	8.79
Northern Bukidnon	24,787	3,154	1031	32.69
Albay	24,603	7,663	314	4.10
Sultan Kudarat	24,212	4,508	2946	65.35
Agusan del Sur	21,196	3,756	941	25.05
Sorsogon	21,007	6,361	577	9.07
Iloilo	20,023	6,580	768	11.67
Sarangani	19,973	2,999	3053	101.80
Quezon-II	19,491	2,509	965	38.46
Capiz	18,722	2,302	382	16.59
Negros Oriental	18,133	4,000	1722	43.05
TOTAL*	747, 381	125,409	57,827	46.11

* Figure does not include Philippine overall balance, target and accomplishment.

Source: Department of Agrarian Reform, Summary of LAD Accomplishment by Province (in Hectares), January 1, 2011 to January 11, 2012

Information from the ground reveals more worrisome trends. First, the lands distributed in Mindanao were largely settlement or government-owned lands. According to Nestor Tapia, coordinator of the farmers' federation KATARUNGAN, "99 to 100 percent of accomplishment in Mindanao includes simple land transfer of non-controversial landholdings; private agricultural lands comprising only a small portion." Second, anomalies hound the land distribution process which include several expressions— the voluntary land transfer scheme which are preferred by DAR officials usually involve the transfer of landholdings by landowners to their preferred beneficiaries who are loyal to them; no real land transfer happens but is reported as accomplishment; and overlapping claims with ancestral domain lands which create another layer of social conflict in the communities in Mindanao.

Where's the money, honey?

The reduced budget allocation for 2012 confirms to farmers and agrarian reform advocates' their suspicion of the government's decision to terminate the program by 2014. The achievement of agrarian reform's goals relies heavily on the annual budget allocated by Congress, and for 2012, DAR has proposed close to PhP 18 billion (PhP17.92 billion), which is far lower than the legally mandated budget of PhP30 billion per year. . Of the said 2012 budget, P2.5 B is earmarked for compensable land, which can only pay for 30,000-40,000 hectares of land, far below than their 240,247 hectares target for this year.

On the other hand, PhP 1.6 billion is allocated for support services for 2012. The allotment for support services under CARPER decreased by three percent. What is not indicated in the budget is how much will be earmarked for the initial capitalization and subsidy for the new and old agrarian reform beneficiaries, a new provision under CARPER.

Support services such as credit, irrigation, farm-to-market roads, access to input, which complement land redistribution, have been financed through other fund sources, in particular by overseas development assistance (ODA). Interestingly, the budget for foreign assisted projects almost doubled for 2012— the total amount is almost half the total budget allotted for LAD, and is one-fourth of the overall CARPER budget.

These budgetary cuts will most likely lead to the early demise of agrarian reform.

Limiting the scope of land distribution

A controversial piece of policy is the Administrative Order no. 7 (AO 7), series of 2011, which intends to regulate or limit the scope of land to be distributed under CARPER. AO 7 disallows the transfer of land titles to the Republic of the Philippines for land cases, which are pending due to landowner protests or applications for exclusion and exemption of the landholdings, without the existence of a finalized master list of beneficiaries on July 1, 2009. This will definitely affect large landholdings that are eyed for distribution. For example, the 1,716 hectares of land in Hacienda Matias in Bondoc, Peninsula has been covered by this AO. The landholding was included in the 2011 target but because there was no final master list of beneficiaries, was removed as part of target for 2012 and most likely even for 2013. There are many other landholdings which are being contested by landowners for various reasons and consequently, a master list of beneficiaries will not be available for these lands to be covered by DAR eventually.

DAR's exit strategy

It is probably no secret that the Department of Agrarian Reform after 2014 will close shop or at the least stream-line some of its functions. This was clearly mentioned in the 2012 General Appropriations Act and options are now being discussed by government on what will happen to DAR come June 2014. Insiders in the department reveal that there are five 'options' for DAR's fate. Based on a study by the World Bank (WB), these options include rationalization of DAR's functions to the creation of a new department.

The first option involves the establishment of a Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD), which will combine both the Department of Agriculture's (DA) and DAR's functions. This is similar to the bill filed at the House of Representatives, which aim to combine the functions of three land, natural resources and agriculture departments under an apex body. Under DARD, land distribution, administration and management as well as legal and adjudication services on land disputes to agrarian reform beneficiaries will continue. Specifically its mandates include finishing the remaining lands under CARPER. A Bureau of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development will also be created in which support services and staff capacity and skills will be strengthened

The second option entails a "zero budget" for DAR by June 2014, which means that all its operations will be suspended. There are reports that the P-Noy government has a bias for this option. This option is a temporary measure for the smooth transition of operations to other agencies.

The third option includes the transfer of DAR's functions to related agencies. Land tenure and distribution and adjudication of cases will be transferred to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). While support services will be farmed out to the Department of Agriculture and local government units. This option will further centralize land administration and management under DENR.

The fourth proposal, which is proposed by the World Bank, is to institute a Land Use Policy Council, an inter-agency body linking various departments that have land-related mandates. This option according to the WB may save government monies and can be the most acceptable solution to the agencies which will absorb DAR personnel.

Finally, option number five comprises the creation of a Department of Land Reform and Management which will include both rural and urban land development. Rather than limiting the function of DAR, this will strengthen and expand the agency's functions and mandates.

Talks about DAR's close shop will likely create more uncertainty among the rank and file, and officials of the agency. Already, there are reports from organized farmers' groups that such options are creating either paralysis or sluggishness in performance among the local officials of DAR. While this is not at all surprising, DAR's exit plan will be an additional reason for the non-implementation of CARPER.

Whatever the option that the P-Noy government chooses to implement, what needs to be underscored is the urgency of full disclosure of DAR's exit strategy so that the public, especially the agrarian reform beneficiaries, can be informed and participate in the decision making. Equally important is to ask where are the farmers in the DAR's exit plan? It is imperative that the fate and future of small and landless farmers, rural women and farmworkers be included in the framing of the debate.

What's next?

From March to June 2012, organized farmers from around the country will conduct a series of on-the-ground consultations and assessment on the real score of agrarian reform. These consultations will lead up to the State of Agrarian Reform Address which will be organized in celebration of the original CARP's anniversary. Protests, direct actions and land marches are also expected to be organized by farmers. One of these groups at the forefront of the campaign is the Save Agrarian Reform Alliance, a network of landless, small farmers, farm workers, rural women, indigenous peoples and NGOs pushing for the effective, just and immediate implementation of agrarian reform in the country.

The future of agrarian reform may be bleak but landless and small farmers, farm workers, and rural women will not take the issue sitting down. Together with the supporters of agrarian reform such as the NGOs, the Catholic Church, students, urban poor and other rural poor, they will use CARPER's twilight as an opportunity to show the whole country the power of the peasantry and that this, more than any other period, is the best time to seen the realization of agrarian reform. The next few months' actions will not only be for pushing for CARPER's implementation but for the full attainment of its social justice goals beyond 2014.

The struggle will continue. The organized peasantry and agrarian reform advocates will stake their claims, assert their rights, and the P-Noy government will need to stop, look, listen and act. 

 

[i] Willard Cheng, "PNoy told: Fighting graft is good but don't forget CARP", February 14, 2012.

http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/-depth/02/14/12/pnoy-told-fighting-graft-good-dont-forget-carp (Accessed on March 24, 2012)

[ii] Homeres et al 2000 as cited in Flores-Obanil, Carmina and Mary Ann Manahan, "Leaseback Arrangements: Reversing Agrarian Reform Gains in the Philippines" in Land Struggles, LRAN Briefing Paper Series, edited by Rebeca Leonard, Shalmali Guttal and Peter Rosset, October 2007. Available online at: www.landaction.org

[iii] See Romulo dela Rosa's "Corporate Farming Won't Ease Hunger in Mindanao", Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 17, 2004; and "Mindanao: The Experience in the Banana Sector of Davao del Norte" in On Just Grounds: Struggling for Agrarian Justice and Citizenship Rights in the Rural Philippines, eds. Saturnino Borras, Jr. and Jennifer Franco, Quezon City: 2005 as cited in Flores-Obanil, Carmina and Mary Ann Manahan, "Leaseback Arrangements: Reversing Agrarian Reform Gains in the Philippines" in Land Struggles, LRAN Briefing Paper Series, edited by Rebeca Leonard, Shalmali Guttal and Peter Rosset, October 2007. Available online at: www.landaction.org