That external powers and local elites seek to hijack liberation struggles for their own vested interests is reason to strengthen – rather than to withhold – support for the Moros’ struggle for self-determination
 
By Herbert Docena
 
What is most striking about the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) report on its role “facilitating” the peace process in the Philippines is how openly it boasts of its unique capacity to be “an instrument for advancing US interests.”[i]
 
The USIP is special, according to the report, because while it can claim to be separate from the US government, it plays a role in the US’ government’s internal division of labor that no other US agency can. The report makes it clear that it was tasked to do the job by the US State Department and that it worked closely with the US embassy and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) mission in Manila. But its “quasi-governmental, track one-and-a-half” status, USIP claims, supposedly enabled it to earn the confidence of local actors so much so that even members of the government peace panel reported inside information about cabinet discussions to them.[ii] The USIP, “offered a new policy instrument of the US government” which could be “incorporated more frequently into the toolkit of US foreign policy,” notes the report.[iii]
 
The USIP report has become hot copy lately, with the US’ role being cited as one more ground for questioning, if not opposing, the controversial Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The latest result of protracted negotiations that date as far back as 1976, the MOA-AD has been billed as a breakthrough towards ending nearly four decades of war between the central Philippine government and Moros advocating for greater self-rule.[iv] Moving towards the establishment of a sub-state within the Philippines,[v] the agreement has deeply polarized the country and has since been junked by the Philippine government. Another – perhaps more dangerous – round of fighting has erupted.
 
What interests?
The US began to be more involved in the war between the Philippines and the MILF beginning in 2003, with the USIP “facilitating” negotiations through meetings with negotiating panels, providing technical expertise, conducting forums, publishing reports, and other activities. Not unrelated to the USIP’s work, as the USIP makes clear however, has been the expansion of the US military role in the country, as well as the escalation in US “development” and “humanitarian assistance.”[vi]
 
Two possibilities have recently been proposed to explain the US agenda: one is that the US is supporting the creation of an independent pro-US Bangsamoro state as a hedge against a more pro-China Philippines;[vii] the other is that US is deliberately fomenting and prolonging conflict between Filipinos and Moros so as to justify its intervention in Mindanao.[viii] Both assume common underlying geostrategic objectives: access to natural resources, including potential oil reserves, as well as military presence or basing.
 
In assessing these possibilities, it is useful, first of all, to bear in mind the US’ actual record: it has crushed or has sought to crush pro-independence movements in places it has invaded and occupied (Examples: what became the Philippines – including the “Moro” states that were incorporated into it – in the early 20th century, Iraq and Afghanistan today); it has no problems supporting – or not actively opposing – separatist/ pro-independence movements against regimes it doesn’t like (Examples: Kosovo against Serbia, the Kurds against Saddam’s Iraq, Tibet against China, Taiwan over China, etc); but it has also stood by central governments against separatist movements if these governments’ stability and support are seen as more important for attaining US goals (Examples: Georgia over South Ossetia, Thailand over the Patani Malays of Southern Thailand, Indonesia over the West Papuans, Marcos over the Moros in the 1970s, etc).
 
That last example is particularly instructive: from 1972-1976, when the poorly armed and poorly trained Moro fighters took on the might of Marcos’ military, the US provided Marcos over $500-million in military assistance which contributed to tipping the balance against the Moros fighters. [ix] Despite this, the Moros  – despite being poorly armed and poorly trained – managed to bring the war to a stalemate and forced the strongman to the negotiating table. The question is, has the situation changed so much that the US has switched sides in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives, as some believe?
 
Whose side?
What happened as late as last week was telling: when a US military-contracted helicopter went to evacuate injured fighters in an encounter in Basilan, they came to the succor of Filipino soldiers – not Moro rebels.[x] This week, in the latest proof that US troops are not only “training” Filipino soldiers, American soldiers were spotted helping Filipino troops recover unexploded bombs right during a lull in hostilities in North Cotabato.[xi]
 
In short, the US military is shoulder-to-shoulder with Filipino soldiers, not Moro fighters.  From 2002-2006 alone, the United States has given around $250 million not to the MILF but to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (See graph below). This has been equivalent to nearly 10% of the Philippines’ annual military budget.[xii] On top of this, the $260-million worth of “development” aid that the US has poured into Mindanao in the last 6 years[xiii] have been intended to legitimize the national government in the eyes of Muslims – and, hence, to douse support for Moro self-determination movements.

Who have been the targets of the 300-500 US Special Forces that have stayed on indefinitely in Mindanao since 2002 to help Filipino troops in their day-to-day operations? These would have to be the alleged members of the Abu Sayyaf, the more politicized factions of which continue to espouse the original goal of the MILF -- Bangsamoro independence. On several occasions, even members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the other Moro movement which has a peace agreement with the government, have been targeted in operations assisted by the US.[xiv] In at least one documented case, even Moro civilians have been killed.[xv]
 Does the US’s openness to – if not actual encouragement of– the MOA signal a change?
 
Dumping an ally?
While US support for a pro-US Bangsamoro state is not inconceivable, the US can be expected to take this route only after concluding that a) the Philippine state can no longer be counted on to give it what it wants and that it can only get what it wants from a pro-US Bangsamoro state b) that there is a good degree of assurance that this Bangsamoro state will indeed turn out to be pro-US c) the potential benefits of abandoning an old ally in favor of a newly created one outweigh the potential costs.
 
First, is it the case that the Philippine government has become so hopelessly unreliable in promoting US interests and should therefore be abandoned? As we have documented in our report, At the Door of All the East: The Philippines in US Military Strategy, the US has managed to establish a more expansive, more deeply entrenched, more flexible, and less politically obtrusive military presence in the Philippines since 2001.[xvi] The US would not have been able to do this if not for President Arroyo who has gone out of her way – farther than her predecessors – in accommodating US demands.[xvii] 
 
It is true that Arroyo has lately expanded relations with China but, with the economic opportunities China offers, so have many other pro-US allies. The Philippines may have welcomed US$6.6 million in military assistance from China last year[xviii] – peanuts compared to what it gets from the US – but it is still unlikely to grant China what it gives the US – military presence in its territory – nor is it likely to give China what it presumably favors if it could ask for anything – the removal of US troops from the country. In any case, if the Philippines were really in danger of being lost to China, wouldn’t the more rational response on the part of the US be to avoid that from happening by trying to outcompete the Chinese? Wouldn’t the easiest way for the Philippines to fall into China’s embrace be for the US to dump it?
 
Finding new friends?
Second, is there a fair degree of assurance that the leaders of a new Bangsamoro state will necessarily be pro-US – so much more so as to compensate for the loss of a formerly pro-US Philippines?
 
Soliciting the support of external powers to boost one’s standing in internal politics is certainly not exclusive to Filipinos. Contrary to the myth that the Moros were all united in resisting American colonizers in the early 20th century, many datus and sultans actually collaborated with the United States, to fend off Christianized Filipinos’ attempts to dominate them, as well as to preserve their privileged status within Moro society. Many ordinary Moros fought valiantly against the colonizers only to be sold out and betrayed by some of their leaders. The landlords that dominated the Philippine state would not have succeeded in resettling thousands of mostly landless northern peasants to Mindanao, thereby dispossessing and displacing Moros and other indigenous people so they could defuse rural unrest and hold on to their lands, were it not for the legitimization for these actions provided by the participation of Moro elites in the national system of patronage and spoils.
 
Today, there is no shortage of Moros ready to outbid Filipinos in offering Bangsamoro territory and cooperation in support of US foreign policy goals. Indeed, the USIP, along with other US government agencies, has been busy identifying, grooming and financing Moro leaders – showering them with scholarship opportunities, bringing them to the US, employing them, funding their NGOs, etc.[xix] As in other sites of US’ political intervention, the USIP’s and other agencies’ work in “strengthening Intra-Moro communication and unity” [xx] is a deliberate political project to locate, build relations with and build the capacity of those moderate pro-US Moros in an attempt to make them better-resourced and more influential than the alternatives.[xxi]
 
Similar to Moro leaders in the past who preferred being part of a separate colony or protectorate of the United States to being part of the Philippines, some Moro leaders today can justify supporting the US – or at least, not antagonizing it -- as a pragmatic policy for advancing Moro nationalist goals. It is indicative, for example, that neither the MNLF nor the MILF leaderships have come out after all these years to categorically oppose the expanding US military presence in Mindanao.[xxii] After faintly making noise about the US military activities in Mindanao last February, for example, the MILF turned quiet after a visit from US Ambassador Kristie Kenney.[xxiii] A number of influential Moros, many of them among those who have benefited from US patronage, have unsurprisingly come out in support of US military intervention in Mindanao.
 
The calculus facing the leaders of those who have won their independence, however, could be different from that facing those who have yet to gain it. Assuming that the Moros succeed in getting their own state with US support, the Moros would also become less dependent on external patrons for a struggle that has been won. Once this happens, prolonging the alliance with the US could conceivably become harder to sell to the Moro people, sensitized as they are to the plight of fellow Muslims from Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan under US aggression. Moro elites would still want foreign patrons to preserve their power like other elites; but they would also have to be concerned with winning elections or retaining legitimacy. The more likely outcome is a Bangsamoro that is just like many other Muslim-majority countries, such as Indonesia or Malaysia, where support for US foreign policy, while not impossible, has become a political liability that few politicians willing to bear.[xxiv] Hence, betting on a pro-US Bangsamoro state may be a risky gamble that the US may not want to take.
 
A risky gamble
It could take the risk – but only if the probable benefits outweigh the costs. This brings us to our third question: Is the US likely to gain more from the creation of a new state whose allegiances are uncertain than from losing an old reliable ally?
 
Consider the US’ need for basing. While US military presence has expanded in recent years to include areas in Mindanao, a quick look at the map below shows that it covers the entire country. In Mindanao, this presence extends to areas that are not to be covered under the proposed Bangsamoro sub-state. The US Special Forces’ Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines’ (JSOTF-P) headquarters, for instance, is in Zamboanga City, whose mayor Celso Lobregat has been at the forefront of opposition to the MOA-AD and who has made no secret of his “wish” for the US to build a permanent base in his city.[xxv]
 
That the JSOTF-P is in Mindanao is not necessarily in preparation for the rise of a new Moro state:  it is where it is because it is where its presence can be more plausibly explained – Mindanao is where the “terrorists” are – rather than, say, in Batanes, which is closer to Taiwan and mainland China, but where it has no pretext to be stationed in. The JSOFT-P is assured of remaining – and could even choose to expand – in Zamboanga City with or without the consent of the Moros as long as the Philippine government agrees. Why, in abandoning the Philippines for a pro-US Bangsamoro state, would the US want to give up its control of or access to all those ports and facilities in Subic, Nueva Ecija, Batanes, Cebu, General Santos City, etc just to have bases in Mindanao when it can have them all?

 

Could the US just be hedging its bets[xxvi] – not necessarily abandoning the Philippines now but just making sure it has a contingency plan in case the Philippines crosses the line? Or could it just be pitting off the Filipinos and the Moros to make them outbid each other for US support, thereby giving the US the power to hold both on a leash while giving it the pretext to get what it wants (basing, market for equipment, allies)?
 
This is plausible. But it is also riskier than sticking to the status quo because it could turn into reality precisely that scenario that the US may want to avoid: that Filipino elites, not sure of US loyalty, could increasingly be alienated by the US and consequently be lured by China to its side; at the same time, that Moro fighters, realizing that it is bullets provided by the US to Filipino soldiers that are killing them, could turn against the US. Filipinos and Moro elites may often find it rewarding to sidle up to the US, but they are also not unthinking puppets with no regard for their own interests.
 
The larger interests
It is always tricky figuring out how exactly US strategy is conceived: there is always a danger of imputing too much – but also of too little – rationality into US thinking. Another explanation for the US’ interest in the peace talks and its openness to the solution posed by the MOA could be this: the US still wants and needs the Philippines as its ally but in order for it to be of any use for advancing US interests, the Philippines has to be stronger and more stable. And it won’t be so for as long as it remains bogged down fighting various separatist and communist movements simultaneously.
 
More pragmatic and more far-sighted – and hence as self-interested but more cunning – than some Filipino leaders concerned more with keeping their offices or landholdings than with promoting the enduring collective interests of ruling groups, the US probably understands that it is only by addressing what the USIP dares to correctly describe as the Moro’s “legitimate grievances” that the Philippines can disarm the MILF, move on to other enemies, and become the stable reliable ally that the US wants and needs it to be. In so doing, the US is also able to reward, co-opt and strengthen that section of the Moro elites who could otherwise be antagonistic to its objectives or who could lose out to those with more radical social and economic programs should war persist.
 
To keep all three – Moro, Filipino, and US elites – together, however, the acceptable solution for the US will have to be one which would still promote their larger common interests. It is for these reasons that the MOA’s provisions on natural resources are worth scrutinizing: the US may be indifferent to how the Filipinos and Moro ruling groups split revenues with each other – just as long as, say, UNOCAL, which is already operating in the Sulu sea, and other corporate interests are not shut out from the region. As if to appease all those investors who are already harnessing Mindanao’s resources, the MOA spells out that all mining concessions, timber licenses shall continue to remain in place unless revoked by the BJE.[xxvii] What could be in store is just a US-presided renegotiation in the power relations between Moro and Filipino ruling groups.
 
A continuing struggle
A more stable Philippines, with a Mindanao that is “peaceful” and open for business, with pliant, relatively more powerful and less subordinated Moro elites at its helm, seems to be a more ideal scenario for the US than an antagonized pro-China Philippines and/or an independent Bangsamoro state with leaders who have uncertain loyalties. But while this scenario is rosier for the US, and arguably even for Filipino elites, it may not necessarily lead to liberation.
 
To the extent that the MOA promises more power to the Moro people as a whole, much more than any agreement achieved in over thirty years of fighting and negotiations, it can potentially be a step away from the Moros’ long history of marginalization as a people, so long as it does not end up trampling on the rights of other oppressed peoples. How that power will be used and for whose benefit, however, will only be decided in a continuing contest: whether it is a step towards emancipation depends on who will eventually prevail.
 
As is to be expected, in this struggle, other self-interested parties are attempting to hijack the Moros’ right to self-determination to their advantage. To oppose measures that would advance the Moros’ struggle – in the hope of frustrating these parties – may backfire: it could only end up pushing the Moros into these parties’ embrace, allowing them to pass themselves off as their protectors. That others seek to instrumentalize the Moros’ struggle is no reason to turn our backs on all those who, along with the landless Christian migrants or the indigenous peoples, have been historically oppressed and who have long been advocating for a just end to the war. It is even more reason to stand by their side.# 
 
Herbert Docena (herbert@focusweb.org) wrote Focus on the Global South’s special report on the US military presence in the Philippines, ‘At the Door of All the East’: The Philippines in US Military Strategy

[i] G. Eugene Martin and Astrid Tuminez, “Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines: A Summary Assessment of the USIP Philippine Facilitation Project, 2003-2007,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report 202, February 2008, p. 2,14.
[ii] Notes the report: “The PFP [Philippine Facilitation Project] staff met often with members of the GRP [Government of the Republic of the Philippines] negotiating team and occasionally received reports that their recommendations on policy, negotiating strategies, and tactics were discarded, weakened, or undercut by cabinet members.” (p.13)
[iii] “Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines,” p.14, 19. For a critical profile of the USIP, see Interhemispheric Resource Center, “United States Institute of Peace,” http://rightweb.irc-online.org/gw/2814.html. For a journalistic profile of the institute, with quotes from USIP staff involved in the Philippines, see Corine Hegland, “Peace Work,” National Journal, April 26, 2008, http://nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/fa_20080426_5541.php
[iv] For more on the war, see Kristina Gaerlan, and Mara Stankovitch (eds.), Rebels, Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000); Thomas McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing Inc., 2000); Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda M. Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao (Manila: Institute for Popular Democracy and Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs, 2000); Patricio N. Abinales, Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000)
[v] The proposed state will be in a “free association” with but will not separate from the Philippines. For more on this, see Soliman M. Santos Jr. “BJE and the question of independent statehood,” August 12, 2008
[vi] For more on this, see ‘At the Door of All the East’: The Philippines in US Military Strategy (Quezon City: Focus on the Global South, 2008), www.focusweb.org/at-the-door-of-all-the-east.pdf
[vii] William M. Esposo, “What's in it for the US in an independent Moroland?,” Philippine Star, September 2, 2007; “ARMM polls deferment: The confluence of 3 agendas,” Philippine Star, July 29, 2008; “The Untold Realities of the MILF Peace Pact,” Philippine Star, August 5, 2008; “Know how the BJE serves US geo-political interests,” Philippine Star, August 12, 2008
[viii] Kilusan para sa Pambasang Demokrasya’s rejects the MOA-AD, claiming it was a “handiwork of the US government”, which would allow the US to play a “de facto peacekeeping role” between both sides, thereby allowing it to establish US military installations within Bangsamoro territory  (“Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE): A US-Crafted Territory,” Press statement, August 8, 2008). National Democratic Front of the Philippines chief political consultant Jose Maria Sison reasons along the same lines: He claims the US and the Philippine governments are foisting the MOA on the Moros “as a device of pretended generosity in order to seize the initiative” to prolong the peace talks and to justify deploying US and Filipino troops to Mindanao for oil, bases, and other resources (Jose Maria Sison, “Pretense at Generosity with Full Malice by US Imperialism and the Arroyo Regime,” Press statement, August 15, 2008; see also TJ Burgonio, “MILF sought US intervention in peace talks with RP gov’t,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 15, 2008)
[ix] US Military Assistance to the Philippines, 1972-1976 (US Agency for International Development [USAID], “US Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations,” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/index.html)
[x] Nikko Dizon, “TV reporter witnesses 4-hour dying of a Marine,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 13, 2008
[xi] Carolyn Arguillas, “US troops join search for unexploded bombs in conflict area,” MindaNews, August 18, 2008; For more on US troops’ involvement in the war, see Unconventional Warfare: Are US Troops engaged in an ‘Offensive’ War in the Philippines? (Quezon City: Focus on the Global South, 2008) http://www.focusweb.org/index.php?option=com_remository&Itemid=105&func=startdown&id=23
[xii] US Military Assistance to the Philippines, 1972-1976 (US Agency for International Development [USAID], “US Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations,” http://qesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/index.html; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Facts on International Relations and Security Trends database,” http://first.sipri.org/
[xiii] USAID, “Activities in Mindanao,” http://philippines.usaid.gov/documents/about/activities%20in%20mindanao.pdf
[xiv] Herbert Docena, “On-the-Job Training: Are US soldiers engaged in actual combat in the Philippines?,” Focus on the Global South, March 9, 2006
[xv] See complete report of the Philippine Commission on Human Rights Region IX office, docketed as CHR-IX-2008-2221
and approved by Atty. Jose Manuel S. Mamauag MNSA; Citizens Peace Watch, Report of the Fact-finding Mission to Zamboanga City and Sulu, February 2008
[xvi] ‘At the Door of All the East’: The Philippines in US Military Strategy (Quezon City: Focus on the Global South, 2008), www.focusweb.org/at-the-door-of-all-the-east.pdf
[xvii] It is true that Arroyo withdrew from the US-led “coalition of the willing” occupying Iraq but so have many other pro-US allies which the US has not and will conceivably not want to abandon:  Japan, Italy, Thailand, etc. In any case, what Arroyo has done to make up for that withdrawal arguably outweighs what she may have deprived the US of: a little over 100 Filipino soldiers in a 160,000-strong occupying army.
[xviii] Noel Tarrazona, “US, China vie for Philippine military influence,” Asia Times, September 20, 2007
[xix] In this, a certain Ishak Mastura’s recommendation to the US seems to be being heeded. In a blog titled, “Moro Views on Bangsamoro affairs,” a post under his name reads: “My best advice for the US, Australia and other interested international actors in Mindanao is to identify the Moros that can be on your side, befriend them, offer them support on their legitimate aspirations… and you can be sure of longer term gains in the Great Game as China looms on the horizon.” It is not clear whether it is the same Ishak Mastura, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao Department of Trade and Industry Secretary, who has also urged the United States to establish a “pro-Western Muslim polity” to check China’s rise (See Footnote 19). Whether such views have resonance among Moros – especially elites -- is also difficult to ascertain but it at least demonstrates that such notions – of soliciting US support in exchange for promoting US foreign policy goals – are being entertained.
[xx] “Toward Peace in the Southern Philippines,” p. 14.
[xxi] For more on US efforts to build the capacity of local elites supportive of its strategic objectives, see William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For an analogous project, that of the US in Iraq, which illuminates similar dynamics in Mindanao, see Silent War: The US’ Ideological and Economic Occupation of Iraq (Bangkok: Focus on the Global South, 2005)
[xxii] Rank-and-file members however have expressed their opposition to the US presence and have joined campaigns against it, though its not clear whether they have done so with the tacit encouragement of their leaders or in defiance of them.
[xxiii] Jason Gutierrez, “US envoy Kenney, MILF chief Murad meet on peace process,” Agence France Press, February 19, 2008
[xxiv] See pp 91-106 of ‘At the Door of All the East’
[xv] Julie Alipala, Jeoffrey Maitem, Jeffrey M. Tupas, “Mayor says US bases wishful thinking,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 29, 2008
[xxvi] “To hedge their bets” is in fact what, according to Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao Trade Secretary Datu Ishak Mastura, the US should consider doing in the face of China’s increasing influence in the Philippines. He wrote: “[T]he present stalemate between the MILF and the Philippine military presents [the US and Japan] the opportunity to hedge their bets with the Bangsamoro. This can be done by establishing a pro-Western Muslim body polity in Southeast Asia through the re-territorialization of a Bangsamoro homeland within the Philippine state.” Mastura also advises the US, if it wants its counter-terrorism efforts to succeed, to take the local Muslim population’s “state-building and power-sharing agenda seriously.” (Datu Ishak Mastura, “Security for Economic Growth: Ethnic conflict and the US in Southern Philippines,” http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2007/04/security-for-economic-growth-ethnic.html
[xxvii] “Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001”

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by Aya Fabros

 

Mindanao is again at the forefront of people's minds these days, including the government, which appears to be keenly pursuing Moro-related items as priority agenda. At least two important 'breakthroughs' are at the center of the public eye- automated elections in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the peace negotiations between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).  These developments have become a cause for both celebration and concern, with new dimensions to long-unresolved, complex and tension-ridden issues surfacing.

In the wake of resounding calls for election modernization, a much awaited milestone has taken place in the August ARMM elections, which launches automated polling in the country. This inaugural in ARMM is quite symbolic, with the region previously tagged as a bastion of  electoral fraud and violence, the 'cheating capital of the Philippines', pioneering in modern, computerized elections. The August 11 exercise made use of digital recording equipment (DRE) and optical mark readers (OMR), which automated the casting and counting of votes.

 

The ARMM figured quite prominently in controversies surrounding the 2004 presidential elections (Hello Garci) and the 2007 senatorial elections (Zubiri and the last seat). Lanao and Maguindanao for instance have become notorious for providing the 'swing votes' that make or break national electoral bids, through wholesale 'dagdag-bawas'  (vote padding and vote shaving) operations. In 2007, Juan Miguel Zubiri claimed the 12th senate seat, edging out Aquilino Pimentel III by a narrow margin of around 18,000 votes. Zubiri dominated the polls in the ARMM, particularly in Maguindanao. Massive vote-rigging operations in the 2004 Presidential elections, which purportedly assured Gloria Arroyo's one million vote-margin target courtesy of the infamous Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano,  were concentrated in the region, according to reports following the Hello Garci scandal. There are approximately 1.5 million registered voters in the ARMM, as of 2008.

 

With the historical weight of scandal after scandal that has made many sectors extra-cautious when it comes to elections in the region, the August inaugural has stirred a lot of attention and discussion. Prior to the actual exercise, several groups have already underscored possible problems that may arise. According to Roberto Verzola, secretary-general of Halalang Marangal, "we shouldn't relax our guard just because we are automating the elections... Everyone thinks that if we automate the elections, then all our problems will go away. However, if you look at the experience of other countries, the old problems still persist and new problems crop up." Halalang Marangal, a non-profit, non-partisan consortium working toward credible elections, recommends an audit of the August 11 results, as it stressed that computerization will not completely eliminate room for cheating and other errors that happen before, during and after elections.

 

"More than a technological problem, election fraud is really a social problem and therefore calls for social solutions, supported by technological means. The only effective social solution to fraud in elections is eternal vigilance and punishment for the cheats," Verzola added.

The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) maintains that the ARMM elections was successfully carried out, with a 50-60 percent turnout. Still, the Citizens Coalition for ARMM Electoral Reforms (C-Care), an independent poll watchdog comprised of people’s organizations, NGOs, sectoral groups and electoral reform advocates, reported cases of under-age voters, vote buying, disenfranchisement, and ballot-box snatching. However, these have been cast as 'minor incidents.' 

Nevertheless, groups remain 'upbeat' about the automated elections in the ARMM, now dubbed as a 'milestone', which will pave the way for the full automation of the 2010 elections. Automation law requires equipment testing and pilot exercises before implementing computerized polls at a national scale. At one point, questions regarding 2010 have cropped up, given recommendations to postpone the ARMM elections to give way to MILF's request in connection with ongoing negotiations regarding the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). 

The agreement between the MILF and the government is another key development that has made Mindanao a significant subject in news and public debates. In late July, Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, Hermogenes Esperon Jr, announced a 'breakthrough' in the GRP-MILF talks, with the signing of a joint communique on the issue of ancestral domain. A Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), which extends the territory, power and authority of Bangsamoro beyond what is already given to the autonomous region, eventually surfaced. During her State of the Nation Address (SONA), Gloria Arroyo expressed her commitment to resolve 'the endless conflict in Mindanao' as she declared, "A comprehensive peace has eluded us for half a century. But last night, differences on the tough issue of ancestral domain were resolved."

On paper, the MOA-AD, which constitutes the BJE, is considered thus far the most substantial agreement between the GRP and Moro revolutionaries, as far as the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination is concerned. The comprehensive scope of the BJE has provoked protests from various camps, including some Mindanao local government officials and their constituents, from North Cotabato for instance, parts of which have been included in the expanded Bangsamoro region. This Bangsamoro area recognizes the historical territory of Moros, including Mindanao and parts of Palawan, areas which will still undergo a plebiscite process that will determine inclusion in the BJE. It is not only the expansion of the territory that's being opposed but also provisions that reportedly allow the BJE to maintain an army, control natural resources and revenues, engage in trade with other countries, set up its own banking system, among others. Several legal experts have pointed out that the deal is unconstitutional, with the Arroyo administration entering into an agreement which contains provisions that it won't be able to deliver. The supreme court eventually stepped in, issuing a temporary restraining order (TRO) on the signing, in order to deliberate on issues "before some irreversible acts are done," according to SC spokesperson, Jose Midas Marquez.

The secrecy and haste that surround the deal aroused speculation that the MOA, predicated on a shift to federalism as well as constitutional amendments, is deliberately intended to fail, meant to create openings that will extend Arroyo's term either through Charter Change or Martial Law. While many groups in Mindanao consider this agreement a significant step forward, the whole issue has been complicated and muddled up by competing interests, political motives as well as strategic and economic stakes in the region. As some quarters cry 'treason', 'negotiated land grab', and 'dismemberment of the Republic', reviving and escalating what many camps call 'anti-Moro' sentiments, the timing of the agreement and the sudden change in stance (of the government) with respect to the MILF and the ARMM are being questioned. 

Administration figures behind this deal, who are notorious for pushing their own narrow interests, or that of their principals, do not help in bolstering the merits of the MOA-AD and the Bangsamoro struggle for self-determination, much less in ensuring a definitive conclusion to the conflict in Mindanao. Of course, shrewd politicians are well aware that loading sensitive negotiations with political motives and vested interest endangers the whole process, and may even end up exacerbating the conflict rather than resolving it.
All this speculation paints a picture of callous, calculating politicians who would not think twice risking further division and suffering as they pursue their personal political interests.  The cruel reality is that these speculations are more credible than the trapos (Filipino term for rag and traditional politicians) that figure in this issue. Worse, dubious characters, the likes of Arroyo and Esperon (who are mentioned several times in the Hello Garci conversations, as well as associated with the armed offensive in Mindanao) are spearheading such a crucial process, while millions of citizens, who have suffered the consequences of conflict and underdevelopment in the region, have little access to information and decisions that will affect them significantly.

These two events, the ARMM elections and the ongoing peace process, are linked not only because they take place in Mindanao, a much-neglected region that has endured more than its fair share of setbacks, suffering, and strife. A more staggering cross-cutting feature has to do with the players involved. The suspicion and confusion surrounding these issues have to be traced back to (and pinned on) the ardent proponents behind the renewed interest and aggressive action pertaining to Mindanao. Apparently, the lack of credibility and legitimacy of the Arroyo administration has spilled over and spoiled resolutions and measures, even before any systematic discussion on the substance and merits of existing propositions have taken place.

With such a distrusted and despised president at the helm, it's evident why the Mindanao question continues to be muddled up. Moves and motives of the current administration have always been viewed with utmost scrutiny and suspicion. It wouldn't be a surprise if results of the ARMM elections end up being contested, or if speculation on automation testing in ARMM (as a means to find ways to subvert computerized elections rather than address the problem of electoral fraud) surfaces, given the track record of this regime in institutionalizing electoral fraud. 

In the case of the MOA-AD, the MILF certainly has the right to push forward with the Bangsamoro agenda and make the most of openings that come up. However, it seems to have picked the wrong regime to strike a deal with, if the goal is to pave the way toward long term peace and resolution to the problems that persist in Mindanao. The Arroyo administration, faced with its own crisis, is in no position to sort out such a complicated matter. Neither does it have the time nor the resolve to actually deliver on its promises. At this point in time, anything this administration comes up with has virtually zero chance of gaining support and consensus, even less when it comes to complex, long-standing issues that require very thorough deliberation, consultation and agreement. The Arroyo government’s vacillating position on the MOA-AD, including announcements that the GRP will not sign the agreement in its present form (considered by the MILF as a ‘done deal’), as well as this administration’s role in renewed hostilities in Mindanao, aggravates the situation even further.

In as much as the Bangsamoro struggle is rooted in historical injustice and legitimate grievance, Mindanao will have to proceed with caution and perhaps, wait a little longer, seek out and enlist earnest champions, for lasting solutions to emerge and truly take root. The question is, can we still afford and manage to stall the ticking time-bomb in Mindanao? As we straddle this tricky balancing act, the exploitation of Mindanao continues to heighten, with varied interests capitalizing on its resources and votes, as well as its conflicts, struggles and dilemmas. #

by Miriam Coronel Ferrer

(This article first came out August 11 in the author's EYES SEE column on ABS-CBN News Online. www.abs-cbnnews.com)

 

For a long time, Indonesia refused to let go of East Timor even if it meant military occupation of the territory and international condemnation for the massive human rights violations committed to enforce its rule. Then the 1997 regional economic crisis struck. Indonesia's economy crashed and the Suharto regime was shaken. Indonesians wondered if keeping their conflict-ridden, lowest-income province was worth the trouble. With the economy in shambles and the New Order regime besieged, they could not afford the added aggravation posed by the 20-year conflict in East Timor.  This confluence of events loosened thinking on the immutability of the republic's territory among the Indonesian political elites and the public. "Free Indonesia from East Timor!" even became the slogan of one Java-based campaign group, a call that reversed the earlier demand to free East Timor from Indonesia.

 

East Timor is just one example of how new states were born from existing ones. There are many other new states in Africa and Eastern Europe.  

 

Eriteria was annexed to and later disengaged from Ethiopia. The former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has metastasized into the independent states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. To its credit, Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia peacefully. Quebec almost became independent from Canada but the sovereignists narrowly lost the vote in two referenda. 

 

Meanwhile, the divided countries of North and South Vietnam and East and West Germany have been reunited.

 

I am citing these examples to make the point that states are not fixed and irrevocable entities. This is the wide and deep perspective that we need in order to appreciate the peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, although in fact the talks and the controversial Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on Ancestral Domain are not even about ceding.  

 

Unfortunately, many other political issues and the lack of transparency have jeopardized the process, but let me get to that later. For now, let us just open our minds to this fact: that throughout history, empires, kingdoms, unions and republics were made and unmade by men and women. These political projects were achieved through costly wars, occupations, uprisings, international arbitration, constitutional processes like referenda, negotiations, or a combination of these means.

 

The Philippines was a late 19th century creation. What we call "The Philippines" did not exist since time immemorial, nor was it a product of nature. Neither is it immutable. 

 

The provinces and the politico-administrative units making up the country are even more malleable to redrawing of boundaries. In the short history of the Philippine republic, their histories are even shorter.   The current provinces of North Cotabato, Maguindanao, and Sultan Kudarat were created only in 1973. Since 1914, there was only one Cotabato province, until 1966 when part of it became South Cotabato.  From 1903-1913, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Zamboanga and Sulu made up the Moro Province.   Before the Spaniards came, there was a Cotabato empire ruled by the Maguindanao sultanate, with a counterpart in the Sulu seas under the Sulu sultanate. Before this, there were only island and mountain people governed by tribal councils.

 

***

 

My point is that a new political map of Mindanao and of the country is not unthinkable as it seems. Nor should a remapping necessarily be unconstitutional. 

 

But any remapping should be transparent and consensual so that it would solve rather than create more problems. The lack of prior consultation on the contents of the MOA caused the vehemence that greeted it.  Peace Secretary Hermogenes Esperon's use of executive privilege as excuse only fed the agitation. Moreover, the fear that the peace agreement will be used for a GMA-orchestrated charter overhaul has made it impossible to appreciate the bigger context of what political negotiations can possibly achieve in lieu of war, and how new political arrangements can possibly improve the way things are.

 

North Cotabato and Zamboanga officials base their opposition to the MOA on existing rights or the status quo while the Bangsamoro advocates pursue their historical claims founded on prior rights. Between these two camps, there are other equally legitimate claimants  – the lumad; the different Moro tribes, groups, women, youth and political elites not affiliated with the MILF;  the migrant settlers; the ordinary residents; private business. 

 

Whose rights among them shall prevail? How should any political change take place taking into account the multiple stakeholders to Mindanao?

 

Ideally, any new governance structure should ensure representative and participatory mechanisms so that all conflicting rights are judiciously accorded their due.  Secondly, it is only proper that this new entity be given real autonomy. 

 

Here, I think the MILF was promised what any self-respecting, responsible autonomous local government should in fact enjoy – bigger share in revenues from and control over their natural resources; authority to negotiate overseas development assistance and send foreign trade missions, which some developmental local governments are already doing; reforming the banking system to suit local cultural beliefs and needs; and police power.  (The LGUs and the ARMM have not really been liberated from Malacanang. That's why their officials are so beholden or sipsip. What exists is patronage-based autonomy.) 

 

How then to achieve this political change? Based on the MOA, Congress will have to draft the law(s) for the plebiscite, and the creation and broad design of a more genuinely autonomous government body. Both the plebiscite and enhanced autonomy can be legislated within the framework of the current constitution, or at most through a very specific constitutional amendment.

 

The people of Mindanao in the identified areas will be asked if they wish to join this new entity.  In this plebiscite, they can say NO – just as the referendum in Quebec twice defeated the Quebecois nationalists. 

 

Whatever the outcome, Mindanaoans can pick up the process and through consensus-building chart a new political arrangement for themselves. As things stand, I don't see how the House Representative from the district of Makati can have any more right than the MILF to claim to know what is good for the affected Mindanaoans. I don't see how the Senate can speak in behalf of all when there is not even one Moro among them. 

 

Ms. Miriam Coronel Ferrer is an associate professor at the University of the Philippines, Political Science Department.

(E-mail: mcf178@yahoo.com)

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FEEDBACK

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POLITICAL ROUND UP: Muddling up Mindanao

by Aya Fabros

 

POLITICAL ROUND UP: Making and Unmaking Mindanao

by Miriam Coronel Ferrer

 

UPCOMING EVENTS